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LAW, FACT, AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
G. Alexander Nunn*
ABSTRACT
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is deceptively
complex. Although any first-year law student could properly classify those issues
that fall at the polar ends of the law-fact continuum, the Supreme Court has itself
acknowledged that the exact dividing line between law and fact—the point where
legal inquiries end and factual ones begin—is “slippery,” “elusive,” and
“vexing.” But identifying that line is crucially important. Whether an issue is
deemed a question of law or a question of fact often influences the appointment
of a courtroom decision maker, the scope of appellate review, the administration
of certain evidentiary rules, and the application of preclusive or precedential
weight to its resolution.
This Article seeks to bring theoretical coherence and analytical clarity to the
law-fact distinction. It pushes back against the formal view that questions of law
and questions of fact are categorically distinct. Instead, drawing on legal
process principles, this Article argues that an issue is typically deemed a
question of law or a question of fact because legitimacy concerns demand its
resolution by a particular decision maker. Through that reconceptualization,
this Article’s legal process model offers a number of significant contributions.
First, as a descriptive matter, it explains the cause of the jurisprudential
turbulence surrounding the law-fact distinction. Second, normatively, it
highlights the weaknesses of traditional law-fact model, which enables
institutional aggregations of power. Finally, it promises to transform the
process of classifying issues, turning that analysis into a simple transparent
effort to allocate decision-making authority in a manner that will best optimize
the legitimacy of adjudication—that will best achieve procedural justice.
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INTRODUCTION
Ad quaestionem facti non respondent judices, ad quaestionem juris non
respondent juratores;1 judges do not decide questions of fact, juries do not
resolve questions of law.2 For centuries, this oft-repeated maxim has purported
to offer a general division of decision-making authority within the courtroom.3
With equal fervor, courts have championed their responsibility to “say what the
law is”4 while fiercely protecting the jury’s right to decide certain factual issues,
particularly in criminal cases.5 Corresponding doctrines have also embraced the
law-fact distinction. For example, scholars have rightly emphasized that an
issue’s classification as a question of law or a question of fact often influences
the appointment of a courtroom decision maker, the scope of appellate review,
the administration of certain evidentiary rules, and the application of preclusive
or precedential weight to its resolution.6
But despite the law-fact distinction’s prominent place in the American
juridical system—despite its residence in the Constitution itself7—case law fails
to provide an answer to a seemingly simple yet critically important question:
what distinguishes questions of law from questions of fact?8
1
See, e.g., 1 E. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 155b (1629);
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 720 (1999); 5 ROSCOE POUND,
JURISPRUDENCE 547 (1959). As a descriptive matter, it fails to fully account for the historical American practice,
which saw juries deciding certain questions of law well into the nineteenth century and, of course, included
bench trials. Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 33, 44 (“For much of the century following ratification of the Amendment, federal civil juries were told that
they were responsible for deciding law as well as fact, giving such attention as they might choose to the judge’s
instructions on the law.”); see also Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury,
1999 WIS. L. REV. 377 (1999). Nonetheless, it is now a generally accepted rule of thumb for the division of
decision-making authority at criminal trials, and it helps establish the division of power between bench trial
judges (serving as a proxy for the jury) and appellate courts. See Margaret L. Moses, The Jury-Trial Right in the
UCC: On a Slippery Slope, 54 SMU L. REV. 561, 565 (2001).
2
See. e.g., Moses, supra note 1 (“The general rule, therefore, is that in cases where there is a jury, the
jury’s function is to decide questions of fact. The judge, on the other hand, will determine matters of law.”). But
see Carrington, supra note 1.
3
See Moses, supra note 1.
4
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Heartland Plymouth Ct. MI, LLC v.
NLRB, 838 F.3d 16, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Let the word go forth: for however much the judiciary has
emboldened [another decision maker], we ‘say what the law is.’” (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177)).
5
See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 720 (“In actions at law predominantly factual issues are in most
cases allocated to the jury.” (internal citation omitted)).
6
Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769,
1769 (2003); see also Alan M. Trammell, Precedent and Preclusion, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 565, 586–93
(2017) (critiquing the law-fact distinction as having little explanatory power for distinguishing precedent and
preclusion).
7
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
8
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 385 (2000) (recognizing courts have “not charted an entirely
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At first, the distinction between legal and factual inquiries might seem
elementary. Determining whether it was indeed Clarence Earl Gideon who
robbed the Bay Harbor Pool Room on the morning of June 3, 1961, is a question
of fact.9 Whether the Sixth Amendment entitled Mr. Gideon to the right to
counsel at his subsequent criminal trial is a question of law.10
But as one works in from those polar extremes, the task of delineating law
from fact becomes, to borrow the understated opinion of Supreme Court Justice
Byron White, “vexing.”11
Consider, for example, the issue of “voluntariness” as it arose in United
States v. Barbour.12 In January 1994, Ronald Barbour drove to Washington,
D.C., to assassinate the President of the United States.13 After catching wind of
his plot, Secret Service agents intercepted Mr. Barbour at his hotel, where they
extracted a confession from him in exchange for a promise of mental health
treatment.14 The following day, the agents again visited Mr. Barbour, who was
now involuntarily confined at a private mental health facility.15 During that
second meeting, Mr. Barbour agreed to allow the agents to search his apartment
and car.16 Given Mr. Barbour’s at-risk mental state, was either his confession or
his consent to search “voluntary”? And, more to the point here, is
“voluntariness” a question of law or a question of fact?
For the Barbour court it was both. And neither. The Eleventh Circuit,
following Supreme Court precedent, gamely declared the voluntariness of a
search to be a question of fact;17 two sentences later, it declared the voluntariness

clear course” when classifying questions as factual or legal in nature (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S.
99, 110–11 (1995))).
9
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336 (1963); Brief for Respondent at 2, 20, Gideon, 372 U.S.
335 (No. 155), 1963 WL 105476.
10
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337–38.
11
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982); see Emad H. Atiq, Legal vs. Factual Normative
Questions & the True Scope of Ring, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 47, 49 (2018). Indeed, the
Supreme Court has noted that “the proper characterization of a question as one of fact or law is sometimes
slippery,” Thompson, 516 U.S. at 110–11, while further acknowledging that, institutionally, it has “not charted
an entirely clear course” when attempting to pinpoint the law-fact line of demarcation. Williams, 529 U.S. at 385
(quoting Thompson, 516 U.S. at 110–11).
12
United States v. Barbour, 70 F.3d 580, 584 (11th Cir. 1995).
13
Id. at 583.
14
Id. at 583–84.
15
Id. at 584.
16
Id.
17
Id.; see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996) (“The Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent
to search is that the consent be voluntary, and ‘[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the
circumstances.’” (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 248–49 (1973))).
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of a confession to be a question of law.18 Curiously absent from the Barbour
opinion is any explanation for the differing classifications.
Yet Barbour is far from anomalous in its mystifying approach to law and
fact. In truth, it is merely the tip of the iceberg. The Supreme Court itself, for
example, has considered reasonability a question of fact in the personal tort
context but a question of law in the policing context.19 It has insisted that issues
involving considerations of morality or deterrence value are factual in the
criminal arena but legal in the context of assessing punitive damages.20 Without
any attempt to reconcile or even recognize its differing treatment, the Court has
determined that the unconscionability of a contract,21 the appropriateness of an
implied price term,22 “actual malice” in a defamation suit,23 probable cause,24
the “obscene” or “patently offensive” nature of a publication,25 and the
effectiveness of counsel26 are to be treated like questions of law subject to de
novo review, but issues including malicious prosecution,27 aggravating and

18
Barbour, 70 F.3d at 584; see also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1985) (“‘[V]oluntariness’
is a legal question . . . . Although sometimes framed as an issue of ‘psychological fact,’ the dispositive question
of the voluntariness of a confession has always had a uniquely legal dimension.” (internal citation omitted)).
19
Compare Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873) (“[A]lthough the facts are
undisputed it is for the jury and not for the judge to determine whether proper care was given, or whether they
establish negligence.”), with Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007) (“[T]he reasonableness of [an
officer’s] actions—or . . . ’[w]hether [respondent’s] actions have risen to a level warranting deadly force’—is a
pure question of law.” (internal citation omitted)). Those who attempt to make sense of the law-fact distinction
often utilize reasonableness in the personal tort and contract contexts to advance their frameworks. See, e.g.,
Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1781–83; Thomas v. Gen. Motors Acceptance, Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 308 (7th
Cir. 2002); Richard D. Friedman, Standards of Persuasion and the Distinction Between Fact and Law, 86 NW.
U. L. REV. 916, 922–24 (1992); Atiq, supra note 11, at 59, 61.
20
See Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 65 U.S. 544, 552 (1860); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc.,
532 U.S. 424, 432–33 (2001).
21
See Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Chronister Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 437, 439 (C.D. Ill. 1988) (“Whether
the contract is reasonable or contrary to public policy is ultimately a question of law.” (internal citation omitted));
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002) (“If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or
any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract[.]”); Atiq, supra note 11, at 62.
22
See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002); Atiq, supra note 11, at 61.
23
See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501–02 (1984).
24
See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1787–88.
25
See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 159–61 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973);
Atiq, supra note 11, at 98.
26
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698–99 (1984); Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1787–88.
27
See Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 65 U.S. 544, 552 (1860) (“Whether the prosecution was or was not commenced
from malicious motives, was a question of fact[.]”).
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mitigating sentencing factors,28 ordinary care,29 discriminatory intent,30 and
proximate causation31 are quasi-factual issues warranting deferential review.32
At best, then, a holistic examination of the case law leaves one with the
impression that varying conceptualizations of the law-fact distinction have
become balkanized within different subject matter groupings. Although there is
perhaps a discernible test for distinguishing legal issues from their factual
cousins within the narrow confines of a specific doctrine, these intra-doctrinal
tests are seen to be highly contradictory when viewed in the aggregate. And the
conspicuous absence of a trans-substantive framework for distinguishing
questions of law from questions of fact ultimately leads one to wonder whether
the law-fact distinction actually encapsulates some immutable truth about
different types of adjudicative issues or if it is instead, as some scholars suggest,
simply a legal fiction.33
This Article explores the theoretical roots of that question. As is likely now
evident, the orthodox, preeminent, and perhaps intuitive understanding sees the
law-fact distinction as differentiating between conceptual kinds.34 That is,
questions of law are believed to possess certain inherent qualities that are
separate and distinguishable from those exhibited by questions of fact35—legal
inquiries are as different from factual inquiries as apples are from oranges. And
just as one can easily distinguish apples from oranges by relying on a class of
certain reference points (e.g., the fruit’s color, taste, and density), one too can
28
See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); Woodward v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 1045, 1047–
48 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
29
See Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1781.
30
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.21 (1986); Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1787–88.
31
See Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present Darkness,
69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 57 (1991).
32
The format of the preceding list has been adopted from Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1787–88.
33
See, e.g., id. at 1787–88, 1807; Kathleen L. Coles, Mixed Up Questions of Fact and Law: Illinois
Standards of Appellate Review in Civil Cases Following the 1997 Amendment to Supreme Court Rule 341, 28
S. ILL. U. L.J. 13, 31–32 (2003) (“Both analytically and in practice . . . the distinction between ‘fact’ and ‘law’
is far from clear cut.”); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 110–11 (1995); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113
(1985).
34
In line with this approach, a number of scholars have proposed different theoretical frameworks for
distinguishing law from fact. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 198 (1990);
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Preclusion as to Issues of Law: The Legal System’s Interest, 70 IOWA L. REV. 81 (1984);
Friedman, supra note 19. However, no one ground of distinction has yet taken hold with a persuasive level of
descriptive and prescriptive force.
35
As will be discussed in detail below, see infra Part II.A, the traditional conceptualization of the lawfact distinction seems largely to be a vestige of a formalist period when the law was considered autonomous and
self-justifying. During this time, even vague constitutional questions were deemed non-legal. See Thomas C.
Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 34 (1983) (“To the legal science mentality such open-ended
questions were political, not legal, and the courts abandoned any scientific role in trying to answer them.”).
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easily distinguish law from fact, so long as the law-fact classifier is also using
the correct reference points. So, on this view, the classification process should
be a relatively easy endeavor. To classify an issue, one must simply identify the
intrinsic nature or epistemological demands of that issue and, based on that
assessment, categorize it as a question of law or a question of fact.
In recent years, however, Professors Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo have
led a group of scholars who are increasingly pushing back against the traditional,
orthodox notion of the law-fact distinction.36 This new wave of scholarship
suggests that the emperor has no clothes; the law fact-distinction is, ultimately,
just a façade. Rather than relying on a theoretical line of demarcation to contrast
law from fact, courts and lawyers classify issues in a functionalist fashion to
achieve certain instrumental ends.37
Until now, most of this consequentialist scholarship has focused primarily
on deconstructing the traditional law-fact model.38 If one accepts Allen and
Pardo’s core notion of law-fact indeterminacy, however, scholarship should also
explore novel law-fact models to rival the orthodox accounts. Case law suggests
that, rather than ad hoc proclamations in a sea of uncertainty, some constellation
of factors is motivating and constraining the classification process.39 And if
classification constraints do not emanate from immutable truths regarding
differences between legal and factual questions, pinpointing that which actually
drives (or, that which should drive) classification is of central importance. If the
classification of issues is not an end in itself, what does it serve as a means for?
This Article contributes to a growing body of literature by suggesting that
the answer lies in principles of procedural justice. Relying on process theory,
this Article joins the consequentialist school and argues that the law-fact
distinction is indeed best conceptualized as a tool to a greater end.40 Rather than

36
See Allen & Pardo, supra note 6; see also Ned Snow, Who Decides Fair Use—Judge or Jury?, 94
WASH. L. REV. 275, 314 (2019) (pushing back on the law-fact distinction in the context of fair use); Amanda
Reid, Deciding Fair Use, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 601, 601–02 (2019) (arguing that the question of whether
copyright fair use is a jury or legal question is a matter of pure policy); cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 237 (1985) (suggesting that, for difficult issues, “[t]he real issue is not
analytic, but allocative: what [decision maker] should decide the issue?” (footnote omitted)).
37
See Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1806 (“[T]he doctrinal distinction between ‘law’ and ‘fact’ . . . must
be decided functionally rather than by reference to purported ontological, epistemological, or analytical
differences between the concepts.”).
38
See id. at 1790–1806.
39
See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 (2001) (classifying an
issue based on “[d]ifferences in the institutional competence of trial judges and appellate judges”).
40
As will be discussed in Part II.B, the legal process conceptualization of the law-fact distinction
advanced by this Article accepts and builds on Ronald Allen & Michael Pardo’s previous work dismantling
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finding the label “question of law” and “question of fact” solely contingent on
the intrinsic nature of an issue, this Article’s procedural justice model sees the
classification of an issue as motivated and constrained by a desire to see
questions delegated to the most legitimate decision maker.41 Stated differently,
an issue is deemed a question of fact or a question of law not because it exhibits
any particular quality, but instead because legitimacy and fairness concerns—
concerns of procedural justice—demand its resolution by a particular
institution.42 An issue is a question of fact not merely because it requires some
level of historical reconstruction, but instead because the empirical literature
demonstrates that a jury is best positioned to provide a socially acceptable
resolution. An issue is deemed a question of law not solely because it demands
normative considerations regarding rules and consequences, but because
legitimacy concerns favor de novo review by appellate courts. The classification
of questions thus serves as a means of optimizing the legitimacy of the juridical
system—a means of achieving procedural justice—by delegating issues to the
appropriate institutional adjudicator.43
The procedural justice law-fact model here proposed has significant
doctrinal and normative implications.
First, the model has descriptive, explanatory power in how it helps inform
the jurisprudential turbulence introduced above. In many ways, the contradictory
and muddled case law seems to be a surface-level manifestation of a deeper
theoretical struggle between competing classification frameworks.44 Although
courts nominally champion the traditional conceptualization of the law-fact
distinction, their reasoning increasingly betrays that endorsement by exhibiting
significant reliance on considerations of institutional competence when
classifying issues—considerations that lie at the heart of the legitimacy-based
procedural justice model.45 What emerges from this underappreciated theoretical
formal conceptualizations of the same. See Allen & Pardo, supra note 6.
41
See infra Part II.A.
42
That is, the labeling of issues is a task constrained not by immutable differences between law and fact,
but instead by the legitimating potential of various decision makers.
43
See Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143,
1149–50 (2005) (“[L]aw should allocate decisionmaking to the institutions best suited to decide particular
questions, and that the decisions arrived at by those institutions must then be respected by other actors in the
system, even if those actors would have reached a different conclusion.”).
44
See infra Part II.B.
45
See id.; see also Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873) (deeming negligence a
question of fact because, inter alia, “twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does one man,
[so] they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge”);
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 (2001) (“Considerations of institutional
competence . . . fail to tip the balance in favor of deferential appellate review.” (emphasis added)).
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wrestling match is doctrinal limbo, contradictory and inconsistent opinions
fueled by fundamentally irreconcilable conceptions of the law-fact distinction.
But the procedural justice model’s implications are not confined to the realm
of descriptive theory or doctrinal explanation. Rather, in pinning the law-fact
distinction to notions of fairness and legitimacy, the model offers significant
real-world reform. For one, the procedural justice law-fact model prevents
institutional self-aggrandizement.46 Because the traditional conception of the
law-fact distinction rests on shaky theoretical foundations, it is vulnerable (and
historically subject) to abuse as a means of enlarging one institutional decision
maker’s sphere of influence to the detriment of another’s.47 Transitioning to the
process-based framework would enable decision-making authority to be
delegated transparently and issues to be classified in furtherance of a clear end—
procedural justice. Second, the procedural justice model also seeks to bolster the
legitimacy of substantive outcomes themselves by making procedure as fair as
possible.48 With principles of legitimacy as its guiding light, the model sees
previously irrelevant questions of institutional accountability become centrally
important. Which institution can most legitimately decide whether police use of
force is excessive? Which institution can most fairly determine if a defendant
offered information to investigators freely? Granular examination of the
legitimating implications of certain allocations of decision-making authority
drive classification.
This Article has two parts. Following this introduction, Part I delves into
case law to demonstrate the doctrinal incoherence surrounding the distinction
between questions of law and questions of fact. Although courts have articulated
various tests for distinguishing between legal and factual issues, those tests are
often isolated within a particular subject matter area and fail to descriptively
account for contradictory tests elsewhere.49 A survey of the varying treatment of
law and fact demonstrates how the absence of a clear trans-substantive law-fact
line of demarcation gives rise to an unclear and turbulent legal landscape. Part
I then turns from case law to theory, highlighting the two existing predominant
46

See infra Part II.C.
See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 449 (2009) (“From the seventeenth
century onward, English judges used the granting of new trial nominally to enforce, but in reality to redraw, the
fact/law line, thereby steadily reducing the sphere of the jury.”).
48
See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 CT. REV.: J. AM. JUDGES ASS’N 26 (2007)
[hereinafter Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts]; Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the
Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283 (2003) [hereinafter Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy].
49
Compare Stout, 84 U.S. at 664 (deeming reasonableness in the tort context a question of fact), with
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007) (deeming reasonableness in the policing context a question of law).
47
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models of the law-fact distinction. The traditional and intuitive model sees the
classification of issues driven entirely by the inherent, immutable characteristics
of an issue.50 Legal and factual issues are as different as apples and oranges. The
classification of an issue is therefore a simple exercise in identifying an issue’s
inner nature. But recent years have seen the rise of a competing law-fact
framework. Some scholars now suggest that the law-fact distinction is illusory.51
This consequentialist model suggests that there is no theoretically sound basis
for distinguishing legal and factual issues. Instead, courts simply apply labels to
achieve functional ends.
Part II provides this Article’s major contribution by identifying a proceduraljustice-based approach to the law-fact distinction. Rather than pinning the
“question of law” and “question of fact” labels to issues’ inherent qualities alone,
the procedural justice model sees the issue classification process primarily as a
method of allocating questions to the institutions best suited to provide a
legitimate resolution. To build out the model, Part II begins with a survey of the
procedural justice literature, demonstrating how empirical studies and modern
court decisions reflect the increasing importance of procedural justice. It then
explains how a procedural justice model would actually operate in practice,
explaining why the law-fact labels should perhaps remain even after one
embraces law-fact indeterminacy. From there, Part II discusses the implications
of the procedural justice law-fact model, offering an account of how it both
informs existing case law and promises significant beneficial reform in our legal
system. Finally, a brief conclusion provides a summation of this Article’s core
arguments.
I.

WHAT IS LAW? WHAT IS FACT?

The law-fact distinction is among the oldest of legal puzzles. For centuries,
judges, practitioners, and academics have struggled to identify the seemingly
simple yet stubbornly elusive difference between legal and factual inquiries. As
the long-standing interest in and exploration of the law-fact distinction yet
endures, this Part seeks to trace the current contours of the debate surrounding
law and fact. Namely, the pages below highlight existing law-fact incoherence
in case law and offer an overview of law-fact models in the academic literature.

50
51

See infra Part I.B.1.
See infra Part I.B.2.

NUNNFINAL_7.20.21

2021]

8/4/2021 10:02 AM

LAW, FACT, AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

1283

A. The Turbulent Legal Landscape
The law-fact distinction is deceptively complex. After all, any first-year law
student could properly classify those issues that fall at the polar ends of the
continuum:52 whether a defendant punched a victim is a question of fact;53 how
one should interpret “established by the State,” as used in the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, is a question of law.54 Yet as one approaches the
dividing line between law and fact, identifying where factual inquiries end and
legal ones begin proves exceedingly difficult.55
Consider, first, an example introduced above—the issue of voluntariness.56
In a majority of jurisdictions, judges are tasked with determining whether a
confession is voluntary.57 That is, courts consider the voluntariness of a
confession to be a pure a question of law, resolved by judges and subject to de
novo review.58 For a confession to be voluntary, it must be “the product of a free

52
Henry Monaghan notably described the law-fact distinction as a continuum rather than two orthogonal
categories: “[The] distinction posited between ‘law’ and ‘fact’ does not imply the existence of static, polar
opposites. Rather, law and fact have a nodal quality; they are points of rest and relative stability on a continuum
of experience.” Monaghan, supra note 36, at 233, 234–37.
53
Cf. United States v. Wolf, 813 F.2d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Whether [an official] in fact ever verbally
threatened [a defendant] during interrogation is a question of historical fact[.]”).
54
See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 484–85 (2015).
55
See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (“The Court has previously noted the vexing
nature of the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law.” (citation omitted)).
56
See supra notes 12–18.
57
See, e.g., United States v. Feliz, 794 F.3d 123, 130 (1st Cir. 2015) (“[I]n federal courts, trial judges are
tasked with determining the voluntariness of a conviction before trial.” (citations omitted)); Green v. Scully, 850
F.2d 894, 900 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Whether Green waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
presents a question of law that we review de novo in order to make an independent determination of whether his
confession is voluntary.” (citations omitted)); Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d 1279, 1290 (4th Cir. 1995)
(“[W]hether a confession ha[s] been made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any
sort . . . is [a question] of law subject to de novo review.” (quoting Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 689
(1993))); United States v. Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 170 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he ultimate determination of
voluntariness is a question of law reviewed de novo[.]” (citation omitted)); Jones v. Davis, 820 F.2d 405 (6th
Cir. 1987) (“When Miller was decided, it resolved a split in the circuits as to whether in habeas proceedings the
question of the voluntariness of a confession was a question of fact, a mixed question of fact and law, or a
question of law. The Miller Court . . . decid[ed] it was a question of law[.]”); United States v. Wildes, 910 F.2d
1484, 1485 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[V]oluntariness is a question of ‘law’[.]” (citation omitted)); United States v. Estey,
595 F.3d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Whether a confession was voluntary is a question of law subject to de novo
review[.]” (citation omitted)); Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1540, 1541 (10th Cir. 1993) (“The ultimate
determination of whether a confession is voluntary is a question of law reviewable by this court de novo.”
(citation omitted)); United States v. Barbour, 70 F.3d 580, 584 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e review the district court’s
application of the law to the facts de novo.” (citations omitted)).
58
See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1985) (“‘[V]oluntariness’ is a legal question meriting
independent consideration in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Although sometimes framed as an issue of
‘psychological fact,’ the dispositive question of the voluntariness of a confession has always had a uniquely legal
dimension.” (internal citation omitted)).
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and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception on the part
of the police.”59 But labeling “voluntariness” in vacuo a question of law is
neither intuitive nor demanded by an obvious trans-substantive line of law-fact
demarcation. In fact, courts deem voluntariness a question of fact in a number
of different subject matter areas. The voluntariness of consenting to a search, for
example, is a pure question of fact;60 the voluntariness of a waiver, too, shares
that label.61 But the voluntariness of entering into a plea deal is a so-called mixed
question of law and fact.62 And the voluntariness of a confession is a pure
question of law?
The mystery of the law-fact distinction remains puzzling when it arises in
other subject matter areas. The issue of reasonableness, for instance, serves as a
favorite example for scholars trying to make sense of the law-fact distinction.63
First, consider how courts have treated reasonability in the personal tort context.
In a negligence case, a decision maker must determine if a defendant acted with
the standard of conduct attributable to a reasonably prudent person.64
Importantly, this inquiry requires both reconstructive empirical analysis and
evaluative judgment—the decision maker must reconstruct the segment of
historical reality relevant to the issue at hand, but must also make a normative
judgment based on that reconstructed reality as to whether the defendant acted
according to a certain communal standard.65 For example, in a case in which a

59
United States v. Luckey, No. 98-4089, 1998 WL 736448, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 19, 1998) (per curiam)
(quoting Poyner v. Murray, 964 F.2d 1404, 1413 (4th Cir.1992)).
60
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“Similar considerations lead us to agree
with the courts of California that the question whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the
product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all
the circumstances.”); accord United States v. Kimball, 741 F.2d 471, 474 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Garcia,
339 F.3d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Songlin, 697 Fed. App’x 226, 227 (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam);
United States v. Troutman, 590 F.2d 604, 606 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Worley, 193 F.3d 380, 384 (6th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Chan, 136 F.3d 1158, 1159 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Jones, 254 F.3d 692,
696 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Agosto, 502 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Carbajal-Iriarte,
586 F.3d 795, 799 (10th Cir. 2009); Barbour, 70 F.3d at 584.
61
See, e.g., Clark v. Stinson, 214 F.3d 315, 325 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The issue of voluntariness is a question
of fact which should not be resolved by per se formulations.” (quoting People v. Epps, 37 N.Y.2d 343, 350
(1975))).
62
See, e.g., United States v. Sherman, 11 Fed. App’x 653, 654–55 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“Whether
a plea of guilty is made knowingly and voluntarily is a mixed question of fact and law that is reviewed de novo.”
(citing United States v. Gray, 152 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir.1998))).
63
See, e.g., Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1781–82; Thomas v. Gen. Motors Acceptance, Corp., 288
F.3d 305, 308 (7th Cir. 2002); RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 379 (2001); Atiq, supra note
11, at 48; Friedman, supra note 19, at 922–23.
64
See Mark P. Gergen, The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common Law, 6
FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 424 (1999).
65
See, e.g., id.
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barge sinks after an unintentional unmooring,66 the decision maker must not only
reconstruct the events of the day in question, but must also ascertain if the
defendant acted unreasonably in a way that caused the damage.67 Nonetheless,
the consistent rule is “that juries shall decide both the underlying facts and
whether those facts constitute negligence,”68 because both components of the
negligence inquiry—reconstruction of historical reality and normative judgment
about that reconstructed past—are questions of fact.69
So, reasonability is a question of fact? Not necessarily.
Curiously, courts have reached the opposite conclusion when evaluating
reasonableness in the context of policing or, more specifically, § 1983 civil
lawsuits against officers for the use of excessive force.70 To succeed in such a
§ 1983 excessive force suit, a plaintiff must demonstrate, inter alia, that an
officer’s actions were unreasonable or that the plaintiff’s action did not rise to a
level warranting deadly force.71 In many instances, the factual issues implicated
by § 1983 civil cases are decided by juries rather than judges.72 The Seventh
Amendment enshrines the right to a jury trial in “suits at common law,” which
includes a § 1983 action seeking damages for excessive force.73 But, of course,
judges are still tasked with resolving pure questions of law, even in the § 1983
context.74 And, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Scott v.
Harris, “[i]f all material facts are undisputed, the reasonableness of officer
conduct in an excessive-force claim is a question of law that a court may

66
This fact pattern was, of course, the basis for Learned Hand’s “BPL” formula of negligence. See United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
67
See id.
68
Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1781.
69
Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 663–64 (1873) (“Certain facts we may suppose to be
clearly established from which one sensible, impartial man would infer that proper care had not been used, and
that negligence existed; another man equally sensible and equally impartial would infer that proper care had
been used, and that there was no negligence. It is this class of cases and those akin to it that law commits to the
decision of a jury.”).
70
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 375–76, 386 (2007).
71
Id. at 381 n.8.
72
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707–11, 718–22 (1999); see
Catherine T. Struve, Constitutional Decision Rules for Juries, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 659, 661–64
(2006).
73
Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 708 (“[W]e have recognized that ‘suits at common law’ include ‘not
merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but [also] suits in which
legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone
were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered.’” (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433,
447 (1830))).
74
Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8.
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decide.”75 That is, determining whether a police officer’s actions constitute
reasonable force is, according to the Supreme Court, a “pure question of law.”76
Labeling the excessive force inquiry a question of law, though, again seems
analytically nonessential. As is often the case when distinguishing legal and
factual issues, it is not initially clear what is driving the Supreme Court’s
classification. Is it merely a formal insistence that reasonable force, taken in the
abstract, has the theoretical or epistemological qualities of law? But, if so, then
why is the reasonableness of a tortfeasor’s actions a question of fact?77
The same conundrum arises in the contractual context.78 In general, courts
assume responsibility for determining the proper construction and interpretation
of contracts.79 Within this role, courts are occasionally called upon to backfill
missing elements into a contract by establishing a “reasonable” implied term.80
As with the determination of negligence, this inquiry requires a decision maker
to consider “community standards of fairness and policy.”81 But unlike with
negligence, the reasonableness of an implied term is universally accepted as a
question of law.82
The classification of questions related to damages suffers from much the
same inconsistency.83 In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc., the Supreme Court considered whether the issue of proportionality in the
assessment of punitive damages was a question of law or fact.84 Despite a
century of precedent considering proportionality to be a question of fact,85 the

75

Stricker v. Twp. of Cambridge, 710 F.3d 350, 364 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8).
Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8.
77
As noted, those who attempt to make sense of the law-fact distinction often utilize reasonableness in
the personal tort or contract contexts to advance their frameworks. See supra notes 19, 63, and accompanying
text.
78
See Atiq, supra note 11, at 48; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmts. a, c (AM. L. INST.
1981); U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002).
79
See Atiq, supra note 11, at 48; Boatmen’s Ark., Inc. v. Farmer, 989 S.W.2d 557, 558 (Ark. Ct. App.
1999) (“A contract is unambiguous and its construction and legal effect are questions of law when its terms are
not susceptible to more than one equally reasonable construction.” (citation omitted)).
80
See Atiq, supra note 11, at 90; Charles T. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural
Device for Control of the Jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365 (1932).
81
Atiq, supra note 11, at 61 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d (AM. L. INST.
1981)).
82
See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and the
Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 293, 298 (1997) (“The reasonable person, either under the banner of
sanctity of contract or that of fairness, is used to fill gaps in otherwise inchoate contracts.”).
83
See Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1771–75.
84
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001).
85
See Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886); Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1771–73.
76
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Cooper Court took a different approach.86 It noted, inter alia, that compensatory
damages necessitate a wholly reconstructive analysis that sees a decision maker
assessing “the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the
defendant’s wrongful conduct.”87 The calculation of compensatory damages was
therefore rightly classified as a question of fact.88 Punitive damages, in contrast,
necessitate normative judgments in that they require consideration of “moral
condemnation” and deterrence value.89 The Court therefore deemed the
appropriate level of punitive damages to be a question worthy of de novo
review.90 The Cooper Court’s purported rationale, however, fails to square with
the classification of negligence examined above. Recall that, just as with an
assessment of punitive damages, determinations regarding the reasonableness of
a defendant’s actions in a negligence case require normative, moral judgments
reaching far beyond reconstructive inquiries about the historical past.91
The inconsistency evident in the personal tort, policing, contract, and
damages contexts is merely the tip of the iceberg.92 Taken together, a holistic
examination of the jurisprudence surrounding the law-fact distinction leaves one
seeking the key differentiating factor between legal and factual issues with more
questions than answers.
B. (Attempting to) Make Sense of Law-Fact Jurisprudence
Making sense of law-fact jurisprudence is no mean feat. Minimally, the
survey of case law above makes that abundantly clear. Attempts to classify
issues as legal or factual seem to be driven more by judicial handwaving than
principled reasoning. Courts often appear to advance various grounds that
promise to serve as the key differentiator between legal and factual inquiries.
Those grounds, in turn, initially appear to be a somewhat settled and sensical
understanding of law and fact within the narrow confines of, say, the personal
tort or contract contexts. As demonstrated by the preceding section, however,
those two conceptualizations (and others elsewhere) are proven highly

86

Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 437.
Id. at 432 (citation omitted).
88
Id.
89
Id. (citation omitted).
90
Id. at 436.
91
In fact, highlighting this inconsistency was a major focus of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. See id. at 446–
48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
92
Just consider the extensive discussion of the law-fact distinction in the intellectual property space. See,
e.g., Snow, supra note 36; Reid, supra note 36; Patricia J. Kaeding, Comment, Clearly Erroneous Review of
Mixed Questions of Law and Fact: The Likelihood of Confusion Determination in Trademark Law, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1291, 1292 (1992).
87
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contradictory when viewed in the aggregate. What results is jurisprudential
turbulence—the balkanization of varying notions of legal and factual questions
within different subject matter groupings. And the conspicuous absence of a
trans-substantive framework for distinguishing questions of law from questions
of fact leads one to wonder whether a deeper problem lies beneath the turbulent
surface.
To explore that possibility, this section turns from case law to theory. The
pages that follow seek to offer a general sense of the law-fact literature and,
through that overview, to highlight a growing debate between those who would
see the law-fact distinction as formally meaningful or illusory.
As is likely now evident, the traditional and perhaps intuitive understanding
sees the law-fact distinction as a difference in intrinsic kinds; legal inquiries are
as different from factual inquiries as apples are from oranges.93 And just as one
can easily distinguish apples from oranges by examining a fruit’s inherent
qualities, one can easily distinguish law from fact based on inherent reference
points. So, on this view, the classification process should be a relatively simple
endeavor—courts need only identify an issue’s intrinsic qualities to recognize it
as a legal or factual question.
In recent years, however, prominent scholars have increasingly pushed back
against traditional, orthodox notions of the law-fact distinction.94 Instead, this
new wave of scholarship suggests that the law fact-distinction is just a façade.
Rather than relying on a theoretical line of demarcation to contrast law from fact,
this realist or consequentialist approach suggests that courts and lawyers classify
issues in an ad hoc fashion to achieve certain functional ends.
1. The Traditional Model
As traditionally understood, questions of law and questions of fact are
conceptually distinct.95 That is, questions of law are believed to possess certain
inherent qualities that are separate and distinguishable from those exhibited by
questions of fact. The task of differentiating between legal and factual inquiries
therefore involves a seemingly simple process—one must first identify the
unique, intrinsic nature of an issue and, based on that assessment, categorize it
as a question of law or a question of fact. In this way, the classification of issues

93

See infra Part I.B.1.
See infra Part I.B.2.
95
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 34, at 198 (suggesting that legal and factual inquiries have different
“ontological status[es]”).
94
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is seen as an end in itself. When declaring a question to be legal or factual, the
court’s goal is simply to reveal the question’s inherent, formal structure. It is not
attempting to use the classification process to delegate issues to an appropriate
decision maker or subject issues to a particular standard of review; instead, the
court is merely recognizing an issue for what it is—it is calling a spade a spade—
regardless of the institutional consequences that may follow.
In many ways, this conception of the theoretical distinction between
questions of law and questions of fact is perhaps best perceived as the natural
product of an early era when the law was seen as autonomous and selfjustifying.96 Classic legal orthodoxy advanced the notion of law as a science,
with specific legal rules constituting nothing more than derivations from a
natural law system based on self-evident moral axioms.97 Law was seen as
structurally analogous to geometry.98 Just as Euclid’s axioms were believed to
“not merely [be] human constructs, but rather obvious and indubitable physical
truths about the structure of space, from which nonobvious truths (like the
Pythagorean theorem) [could] be proved by sequences of indubitable deductive
steps,”99 the “fundamental principles of the common law were discerned by
induction from cases; rules of law were then derived from principles
conceptually; and finally, cases were decided, also conceptually, from rules.”100
The law was therefore conceptualized as an internal system—a comprehensive
and complete set of rules and principles to be explicated and applied by actors
wholly working within the system.101 Christopher Langdell, the former dean of
Harvard Law School and a noted formalist, aptly summarized this position:
“Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To
have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility
and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a
true lawyer.”102 Early formalists who embraced the conception of law as an
autonomous science necessarily deemed questions of law theoretically distinct
from questions of fact. Either an issue was within the sphere of legal science or

96

C. C. LANGDELL, 1 SELECTION CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at vii–xi (1879).
See id.; Grey, supra note 35, at 16.
98
Grey, supra note 35, at 16 (“The aspiration of classical orthodoxy toward a conceptually ordered and
universally formal legal system readily suggests a structural analogy with Euclidean geometry.”).
99
Id. at 17.
100
Id. at 19.
101
Id. at 5 (“Langdell believed that through scientific methods lawyers could derive correct legal
judgments from a few fundamental principles and concepts, which it was the task of the scholar-scientist like
himself to discover.”).
102
LANGDELL, supra note 96, at viii.
97
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it was not; either it could be resolved through deduction from higher-order
principles or its answer required some other epistemological approach.103
Over the last century, the conception of law as an autonomous, selfjustifying science has waned, yet the conception of questions of law as
fundamentally distinct from questions of fact remains preeminent. Indeed, a
number of modern accounts continue to search for the ground for distinguishing
legal and factual issues, the dividing line that hermetically seals off legal
questions from their factual cousins.
Consider, first, a position recently advanced by Emad Atiq.104 In his
compelling article, Atiq argues that the classification of normative issues hinges,
in large part, on whether their resolution is dependent on social conventions or
independent moral principles.105 Normative questions that are conventiondependent106—i.e., those questions that require recognition and application of
the practices of, say, merchants, legislators, or judges—are more likely to earn
the label “legal.”107 Assessing the reasonability of an implied price term in a
contract, for instance, requires reference to merchant and regulatory conventions
(rather than any pre-conventional moral norms); reasonability in the contract
context is therefore rightly classified as a question of law.108 In contrast, those
normative questions that are convention-independent—i.e., those questions that
are not resolved by reference to any social framework—are more likely to be
classified as questions of fact.109
Relatedly, Judge Richard Posner has insisted that questions of law and
questions of fact have different “ontological status[es].”110 Judge Posner
suggests that factual issues, such as whether Richard III ordered certain princes
to be murdered, are questions for which there is an empirically correct answer:
“[T]here is no reasonable doubt that Richard III and the little princes were real
people and that the princes were killed by someone . . . the question [is] ‘by

103
Grey, supra note 35, at 34 (“To the legal science mentality such open-ended questions were political,
not legal, and the courts abandoned any scientific role in trying to answer them.”).
104
See Atiq, supra note 11.
105
See id. at 75.
106
Atiq notes that, under his framework, convention-dependent evaluative questions “(1) concern the
distribution of those benefits and burdens that do not implicate matters of fundamental right; (2) solve moral
problems that require large-scale collective action; and (3) arise in contexts where a paramount concern is
respecting the expectations of participants in a convention.” Id.
107
Id. at 51–52.
108
Id. at 54.
109
Id. at 52.
110
POSNER, supra note 34, at 198.

NUNNFINAL_7.20.21

2021]

8/4/2021 10:02 AM

LAW, FACT, AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

1291

whom?’”111 In contrast to the reconstructive historical analysis demanded by
factual issues, legal issues, such as whether the Sixth Amendment affords a
defendant the right to counsel, center around indeterminate normative issues
regarding the proper interpretation or application of the Constitution, statutes, or
judicial opinions.112 Here, Posner sees a relatively clear line of demarcation
between questions of law and questions of fact.
Notably, Atiq and Posner are merely two examples taken from an entire
school striving for the theoretical holy grail.113 What unifies each account is a
perpetual insistence that there exists an intrinsic distinction between questions
of law and questions of fact and, therefore, a court need not look beyond the
nature or demands of an issue to properly label it. Classifying issues is a simple
process of identification; it is the end to be pursued.
2. The Consequentialist Model
Despite the continued prominence of the traditional belief that the
categorization of issues is driven by theoretical differences between questions
of law and questions of fact, there is a conceptually distinct way of considering
the classification process. Rather than seeing the labels “question of law” and
“question of fact” as entirely dependent on the intrinsic nature of the issue at
hand, we can instead conceive of the labels as means to a greater end.114
Leading the way on this front, Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo have
suggested that the law-fact distinction is nothing more than an instrumental
tool.115 In particular, Allen and Pardo insist that there exists no ontological,
epistemological, or analytical basis for distinguishing questions of law from
questions of fact.116 The law-fact distinction is simply a façade. The pursuit of
“legal facts” instead constitutes a narrower type of factual inquiry.117 In all cases,
the answer to the issue at hand will be a proposition with truth value, meaning
that the “law-fact distinction . . . is purely a creature of convention.”118 When
classifying issues, therefore, judges are functionally deciding on an appropriate

111

Id.
Id.
113
See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 34, at 82; Friedman, supra note 19, at 918.
114
See Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1771.
115
Id. (“[T]he decision to label an issue ‘law’ or ‘fact’ is a functional one based on who should decide it
under what standard, and is not based on the nature of the issue.”).
116
Id. at 1790–1806.
117
Id. at 1801.
118
Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 863 (1992).
112
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allocation of authority—they are using the law-fact distinction to achieve some
greater end.119
Although the traditional law-fact model finds its support in formalist legal
theory, this new approach is more easily associated with consequentialist notions
of legal realism. Legal realist theory directly challenges formalism’s core tenets,
rejecting the belief that law has a logical, formal structure that renders legal
answers merely derivative of some higher-order system of fundamental
principles.120 That is, for the realist, answers to legal questions cannot be
deduced by mechanically applying some authoritative legal doctrine to a case.
And attempting to divine the objectively correct answer to a legal issue by
deriving rules from higher-order principles is, to the realist, transcendental
nonsense.121 Using words that could equally apply to the current state of lawfact case law, realist Karl Llewellyn argued that legal systems generally are
composed of nothing more than “ill-disguised inconsistency” because each
contains “a variety of strands, only partly consistent with one another, exist[ing]
side by side.”122 How, then, does the realist decide legal issues? Having
abandoned the conception of law as a formal, logical system, legal realists
instead adopt an external perspective and consider the instrumental potential of
the law.123 That is, as seen in the consequentialist approach to the law-fact
distinction, realists look not for some objectively correct answer deducible from
high-order legal principles, but instead import external metrics and focus on the
normative tradeoffs tied to the potential outcomes of a given case.124 Realists
therefore submit that law often requires an interdisciplinary consequentialist
approach.125

119
120
121

See Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1771.
See O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809

(1935).
122

KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 45 (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi trans.,

1989).
123
See Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1870) (“It is the merit of the common
law that it decides the case first and determines the principle afterwards.”).
124
See Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 489, 510
(1912).
125
See id. Roscoe Pound, for example, argued that courts should use social sciences to evaluate “the actual
social effects of legal institutions and legal doctrines” and determine the preferable path forward based on the
potential consequences of their decisions. See id. at 513. Felix Cohen endorsed a similar approach, noting that a
departure from classic formalism sees law as becoming a study of human motivations and social interactions,
emphasizing concrete human values, desires, and feelings. See Cohen, supra note 121, at 830–34. Summarizing
the realist position with a broad stroke, Oliver Wendell Holmes famously wrote, “[t]he life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience.” O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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Legal realism’s core notion of indeterminacy has profound implications for
its perception of the law-fact distinction. Rather than seeing law and fact as being
delineated by some inherent theoretical line, the realist perspective (much like
Allen’s and Pardo’s) sees the law-fact distinction as another tool to achieve some
instrumental purpose.126 Stated differently, the natural extension of realist
thought is the conclusion that issue classification, too, hinges predominately on
a functional consideration of the implications of each would-be label rather than
reference to a higher-order rule of division.
But of course, deconstructing the traditional law-fact model is only half the
battle. Allen and Pardo themselves recognize that courts are surely constrained
to some degree when classifying issues127 and, if their constraints do not emanate
from immutable truths regarding differences between legal and factual
questions, pinpointing that which actually drives classification is of central
importance. If the classification of issues is not an end in itself, what does it
serve as a means for?
II. THE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE MODEL
Taking stock, the law-fact distinction has floundered in a state of uncertainty
for most of its existence. To be sure, there are issues for which the classification
process is a simple endeavor. No headache manifests if one simply has to
recognize that the identity of an assailant is a question of fact and the correct
meaning of a constitutional provision is a question of law.128 But in the twilight
zone129—the “vexing” and “slippery”130 middle ground between questions of
law and questions of fact—a principled distinction between law and fact is
seemingly unidentifiable. It is in this twilight zone that traditional accounts of

126
See Lawson, supra note 118 (suggesting that the “law-fact distinction . . . is purely a creature of
convention”); Snow, supra note 36; Reid, supra note 36, at 601.
127
Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1806.
128
See, e.g., United States v. Wolf, 813 F.2d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Whether [an official] in fact ever
verbally threatened [a defendant] during interrogation is a question of historical fact[.]”); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 338 (1963) (noting that whether the federal constitutional right to counsel was violated is a
question of law).
129
Professor Walter Wheeler Cook used this moniker—“twilight zone”—to describe the similarly
muddled middle ground between substance and procedure. Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and
“Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 334 (1933); see also Alan M. Trammell, Toil and
Trouble: How the Erie Doctrine Became Structurally Incoherent (and How Congress Can Fix It), 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 3249, 3251 (2014).
130
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (“The Court has previously noted the vexing
nature of the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law.” (citation omitted)); Thompson v.
Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 110–11 (1995) (“[T]he proper characterization of a question as one of fact or law is
sometimes slippery.” (citations omitted)); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 385 (2000).
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the law-fact distinction struggle. In a vacuum, it is perhaps plausible to insist
that certain normative questions are factual (and others legal) based on some
essentialist line of demarcation, but those formalist theories have, to this point,
failed to demonstrate descriptive power when reconciled with case law.
At its core, then, the law-fact distinction seems mythical, as Allen and Pardo
have suggested.131 Decades of formalist attempts to pinpoint the law-fact line of
demarcation demonstrate that a precise, rather than general, description of the
boundary delineating legal and factual issues is unlikely to emerge. Yet case law
suggests (and scholars recognize) that some constellation of factors is
motivating and constraining the classification process, even within the murky
twilight zone.132 Rather than giving ad hoc proclamations in a sea of
indeterminacy, courts are consistently distinguishing law from fact using a
discrete set of reference points.
This Article seeks to demonstrate that the law-fact distinction is driven,
ultimately, by principles of procedural justice. Without a formalist anchor to
grab hold of when classifying traditionally difficult issues, courts cling to
institutional considerations of competency, legitimacy, neutrality, and trust
when declaring an issue factual or legal—issues that lie at the heart of the
procedural justice movement.133 That is, when it comes to hard issues, most
courts forgo metaphysical analyses, preferring instead deep consideration of the
institutional consequences of each potential label. Note, though, that unmooring
the law-fact distinction from an illusory essentialist theory and tying it to
principles of procedural justice is not a surrender to indeterminacy. It is far from
an invitation for ad hoc assessment. Rather, as this section seeks to show, it
requires a deeply contextual analysis that frankly evaluates the shifting sands of
public perception of legitimacy and fairness.134
In three sections, the following pages seek to explain the procedural justice
law-fact model, demonstrate how it informs our understanding of existing law-

131

Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1806.
See id. at 1790 (suggesting that an “enormous complexity of the variables affect[s] the pragmatic
allocative decision”); Monaghan, supra note 36, at 261–62 (encouraging greater consideration of the allocation
of decision-making authority in the classification of issues).
133
For an introduction to the procedural justice literature, see Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts,
supra note 48; Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, supra note 48; Victor D. Quintanilla, Human-Centered
Civil Justice Design, 121 PA. ST. L. REV. 745, 766 (2017) (“Experiences of procedural justice are shaped by
whether parties are afforded a voice and an opportunity to be heard, whether they are afforded a neutral and
trustworthy decision maker, and whether they are treated with dignity.”).
134
See infra Part II.A.2 (demonstrating how the procedural justice model changes the process of
classifying issues).
132
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fact case law, and suggest that a more candid endorsement of the model could
lead to normatively desirable reform.
A. Explaining the Model
A law-fact model premised on procedural justice sees issue classification as
a method—indeed, the central means—of allocating questions to the institutions
best suited to provide a resolution that the public will see as fair and
legitimate.135 On this view, an issue is not deemed a question of law or a question
of fact solely because, in a vacuum, it exhibits a particular quality; issue
classification requires more than the quixotic essentialist endeavor that has
mired the law-fact debate for decades. Instead, concerns of legitimacy and
procedural fairness drive discussion about the appropriate label to apply to a
particular question. The classification of issues thus serves as a means of
optimizing the legitimacy of the juridical system by delegating issues to the
appropriate institutional adjudicator.136
Pinning the law-fact distinction to procedural justice is an intuitive move,
yet one that is undergirded by a robust infrastructure of empirical and theoretical
support. Procedural justice, and legal process theory more broadly, offers a
compelling account of courtroom legitimacy and decisional acceptance.137
Appreciating the theory is central to understanding the symbiotic relationship
between the law-fact distinction and procedural justice.
1. What Is Procedural Justice?
Everyday across the nation, thousands of individuals appear in courtrooms
hoping to resolve disagreements and disputes.138 The people entering courtroom
doors are diverse, shaped by a wide array of different life experiences and
backgrounds.139 Amid this rich diversity, how can courts ensure that parties
respect case outcomes, even in those instances when they disagree with a
particular decision?

135
As I detail below, therefore, the procedural justice model closely tracks legal process theory and its
core tenet of institutional settlement. See Young, supra note 43, at 1149–50.
136
See id. (“[L]aw should allocate decisionmaking to the institutions best suited to decide particular
questions, and that the decisions arrived at by those institutions must then be respected by other actors in the
system, even if those actors would have reached a different conclusion.”).
137
See Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of
Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 128 (1988).
138
See Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, supra note 48, at 26.
139
See id.
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Broadly stated, the procedural justice school suggests that individuals’
subjective beliefs about the legitimacy of judicial proceedings are shaped,
primarily, by courtroom process rather than substantive outcomes.140 That is,
when it comes to courtroom disputes, the manner in which courts handle
proceedings plays a central role in participants’ willingness to accept
decisions.141 Indeed, the procedural justice movement posits that people’s
willingness to accept outcomes is motivated more readily by their perceptions
of how fairly they were treated throughout the process rather than their opinions
about the court’s decision.142 “[H]ow people and their problems are managed
when they are dealing with the courts has more influence than the outcome of
the case” in legitimate decision making.143 Now, that is of course not to say that
people enjoy facing adverse decisions in the courtroom. But rather that they
“accept ‘losing’ more willingly if the court procedures used to handle their case
are fair.”144 Ultimately, then, when it comes to making assessments of fairness
and legitimacy, individuals’ desire to see justice done outweighs their selfinterest in winning a case.
Although this Article primarily examines procedural justice as it manifests
in the psychological and empirical literature, it is worth noting at the outset that
procedural justice has deep and nuanced normative roots. Professor Lawrence
Solum’s leading article, for example, explores the rich theoretical relationship
between procedural justice and legitimacy.145 In accordance with the broad
definition of procedural justice outlined above, Solum’s compelling account
details how adjudication is legitimized not solely through substantive decision
making but also through procedural norms such as party participation.146
Relatedly, those readers familiar with the legal process school will quickly

140
See Tyler, supra note 137 (“[A] key determinant of citizen reactions to encounters with legal authorities
is the respondents’ assessment of the fairness of the procedures used in that contact.”); Tyler, Procedural Justice
and the Courts, supra note 48, at 26; Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, supra note 48, at 284.
141
See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183 (2004) (“[P]rocedural justice
is deeply entwined with the old and powerful idea that a process that guarantees rights of meaningful
participation is an essential prerequisite for the legitimate authority of action-guiding legal norms.”); Kevin
Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction, 44 CT. REV.: J. AM. JUDGES
ASS’N 4, 6 (2007) (“[P]eople view fair procedures as a mechanism through which to obtain equitable
outcomes[.]” (quoting TOM R. TYLER, ROBERT J. BOECKMANN, HEATHER J. SMITH & YUEN J. HUO, SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 75 (1997))).
142
Tyler, supra note 137.
143
Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, supra note 48, at 26.
144
See id. (“[N]o one likes to lose. However, people recognize that they cannot always win when they
have conflicts with others.”).
145
See Solum, supra note 141.
146
Id.
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recognize its close ties to notions of procedural justice.147 Rising to prominence
in the second half of the twentieth century, the legal process school sees the rule
of law’s claims of authority legitimated by institutional design and procedure.
That is, the legitimacy of the rule of law flows from the structural composition
and procedural features of the juridical system rather than the substantive
decisions it produces.148 Indeed, one of the central tenets of the legal process
school—the principle of “institutional settlement”—suggests that “[l]aw should
allocate decisionmaking to the institutions best suited to decide particular
questions, and that the decisions arrived at by those institutions must then be
respected by other actors in the system, even if those actors would have reached
a different conclusion.”149 By pinning legitimacy to procedure and institutional
structure, the rule of law’s authority is preserved despite disagreements about
the law’s substance that are all but inevitable in a morally pluralistic society.
Consider, for example, how the legal process framework operates in the
context of adjudication. In adjudication, “the legal process legitimates the
application of political power through the affective engagements it requires of
the parties to legal disputes, in particular by penetrating the ideals and
preferences of these parties.”150 Within the courtroom, parties actively
participate and transform their brute demands into claims of right based on
reason; in so acting, they implicitly recognize the conditions for their ultimate
victory or defeat and take ownership over their ability to influence the
outcome.151 “In this way, the legal process legitimates disputes not by reaching

147
See HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC MATERIALS ON THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1958).
148
The foundation of this claim runs deep. The legal process school emphasizes the necessity of
cooperation in the pursuit of societal goals or “wants.” Id. at 3–4. Given the inescapable interdependence of
human beings, people chose to live together in groups—societies—in an effort to “maximize the total
satisfactions of valid human wants.” Id. at 113. Therefore, the society must possess a common set of
“understandings or arrangements” outlining what types of conduct will be tolerated. Id. at 3. However, because
there is bound to be some indeterminacy regarding a society’s common understandings, there must also be a
means for clarifying societal requirements. Id. at 3–4. That is, a society must establish procedural methods for
resolving uncertainty about its shared substantive agreements—collectively, these substantive agreements and
procedural methods constitute “law.” Id. at 113–14. And because the law exists to “maximize the total
satisfactions of valid human wants,” id. at 113, citizens have a moral obligation to accept legal “decisions which
are the duly arrived at result of duly established procedures of this kind . . . until they are duly changed.” Id. at
4. For an excellent survey of Hart and Sacks, which greatly contributed to this short summary, see Charles L.
Barzun, The Forgotten Foundations of Hart and Sacks, 99 VA. L. REV. 1, 20–25 (2013).
149
Young, supra note 43, at 1149–50.
150
Daniel Markovits, Adversary Advocacy and the Authority of Adjudication, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367,
1384 (2006).
151
Id. at 1385 (“And at the deepest level, an engagement with the legal process does not just translate or
test disputants’ claims but fundamentally reconstitutes them, specifically by transforming brute demands into
assertions of right, which depend on reasons and therefore by their nature implicitly recognize the conditions of
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settlements that the participants would have accepted before going through the
process, but by transforming the participants (through engaging them) so that
they come to take authorship of the resolutions that the process produces.”152
What sets the procedural justice movement apart from some theoretical and
normative accounts of juridical legitimacy is direct support from both a rich
empirical literature and courts themselves. Procedural justice is not just a
whimsical idea backed by complex legal process norms; it is reflected and
endorsed by judges, lawyers, and litigants alike.
Consider, first, the long litany of empirical studies supporting the core tenets
of the procedural justice movement. In a pioneering 1975 study, John Thibaut
and Laurens Walker conducted a series of simulated trials to assess whether
participants would rather adjudicate claims against them in an adversarial or
inquisitorial tribunal.153 On the whole, the study participants viewed the
adversarial system as the fairer—and more preferable—option.154 Notably,
though, participant perceptions of the fairness of the adjudicatory model
(adversarial or inquisitorial) significantly affected their perceptions of the
fairness of verdicts, even in instances when the verdict was unfavorable to the
participant.155 The outcomes of the adversarial model were more legitimate (and
the outcomes of the inquisitorial model less so) because of perceptions that it
was the fairer process.156
Building on Thibault and Walker’s early work, more recent empirical studies
have demonstrated the importance of procedural justice in real-world settings.
For example, in a seminal 2002 study, Tom Tyler and Yuen Huo examined
public willingness to accept decisions made by judges and police offers in
Oakland and Los Angeles.157 Tyler and Huo conducted wide-ranging interviews
with 1,656 individuals who had recent personal experiences (both positive and
negative) with legal authorities.158 Their study found that individuals’
willingness to accept decisions as legitimate—as opposed to mere willingness
to comply with decisions—is primarily shaped by process.159 To a statistically
their own failure (namely that the reasons do not support the claims in the case at hand).”).
152
Id. at 1384.
153
JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975).
154
See Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, supra note 48, at 293 (summarizing the central findings of
Thibaut and Walker).
155
See id.
156
See id.
157
TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE
POLICE AND COURTS 28–45 (2002).
158
Id. at 30.
159
Id. at 42–45.
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significant level, Tyler and Hou’s study found that “the primary factor shaping
the willingness to accept decisions was the fairness of court procedures.”160
Additionally, procedural justice also played a statistically significant role in
shaping overall views about the legitimacy of the judicial system.161
Still other studies have detailed additional real-world manifestations of
procedural justice. In a 1993 project, for instance, Allan Lind, Carol Kulik,
Maureen Ambrose, and Maria de Vera Park found that the willingness of parties
in federal court to defer to the findings and conclusions of a mediator directly
depended on the parties’ perceptions of the fairness of the mediator’s
procedures.162 Katherine Kitzmann and Robert Emery likewise found that the
fairness of procedures used in child custody disputes directly affected parties’
opinions on substantive outcomes.163
The above summaries merely constitute a fraction of a rich literature of
empirical studies that have found, and continue to find, that procedural justice
norms drive people’s thoughts on adjudicative fairness and, ultimately,
decisional legitimacy.
Beyond academia, recent years have also seen the judiciary itself
increasingly embracing procedural justice. In its 2019 decision in RosalesMireles v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court expressly embraced
the motivating importance of procedural justice and, in particular, the role that
procedural justice plays in legitimating decisions.164 Justice Sotomayor’s
majority opinion acknowledges that “the public legitimacy of our justice system
relies on procedures that are ‘neutral, accurate, consistent, trustworthy, and
fair.’”165 Public legitimacy, for the Court, is inextricably intertwined with
procedural fairness.166 And, as relevant here, the Court frankly acknowledged
that, often, determining correct legal outcomes requires external considerations.
Justice Sotomayor wrote that in assessing outcomes, the Court must be attuned

160

Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, supra note 48, at 28.
See id.
162
E. Allan Lind, Carol T. Kulik, Maureen Ambrose & Maria V. de Vera Park, Individual and Corporate
Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224 (1993).
163
Katherine M. Kitzmann & Robert E. Emery, Procedural Justice and Parents’ Satisfaction in a Field
Study of Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 553 (1993).
164
See Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1908, 1910 (2018).
165
Id. at 1908 (quoting Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared
Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 215–16
(2012)).
166
See id.
161
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to procedural fairness, asking whether legal decisions might lead to a
“diminished view of the judicial process and its integrity.”167
Of course, the Supreme Court is not alone on this front. Other judicial actors
have similarly acknowledged the real-world import of procedural justice. In a
2005 study, for example, a survey commissioned by the Administrative Office
of the Courts of California asked citizens about their perceptions of the
California court system.168 The analysis of the study’s underlying data suggested
that “[h]aving a sense that court decisions are made through processes that are
fair is the strongest predictor by far of whether members of the public approve
of or have confidence in the California courts.”169 Similarly, in a 2007 article,
Judges Kevin Burke and Steve Leben acknowledged the importance of
procedural justice in promoting decisional acceptance in their courts.170
Taking stock, then, judges and scholars alike increasingly recognize the
centrality of procedural justice. In a morally pluralistic society, there will
inevitably be disputes about outcomes in specific cases; tying legitimacy to
process and procedure is not only necessary but effective for decisional
acceptance.
2. A Procedural Justice Law-Fact Model
Procedural justice has become more than a mere academic model seeking to
explain juridical legitimacy. Recent decades have demonstrated its widereaching import, from empirical studies that validate many of its theoretical
hypotheses,171 to Supreme Court opinions that use its tenets to motivate
decisions,172 to state court systems that rely on its principles to drive reform
efforts.173 Recognizing that decisional acceptance and adjudicative legitimacy
are closely correlated with perceptions of fairness, traditional accounts that
would see principled legal decision making as the sole basis of juridical
legitimacy no longer carry the same relative weight as they did a century ago.174
167

Id.
See Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, supra note 48, at 29.
169
Id. (quoting DAVID B. ROTTMAN, TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS 6 (2005)).
170
See Burke & Leben, supra note 141, at 4–7.
171
See TYLER & HUO, supra note 157; Lind et al., supra note 162; Kitzmann & Emery, supra note 163.
172
See Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1908 (reflecting on the extent to which the public legitimacy of the
judiciary is reliant on fair and neutral procedures).
173
See Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, supra note 48, at 29 (describing reform efforts pursued
by the California state court system.).
174
See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169–99 (1992) (describing the decline of legal formalism in the United States); José A.
Cabranes, The Foreign Policy of Our Government’s “Least Dangerous Branch”, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 469, 480
168
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And with the perspective that procedural justice provides comes a new lens with
which to examine old legal puzzles—including the law-fact distinction.
Recall again that, for decades, theoretical accounts of the law-fact distinction
have been frustrated by the inability to descriptively account for the state of the
case law or, alternatively, the inability to normatively prescribe a classification
process beyond ad hoc proclamations from judges. Formalist accounts that offer
a trans-substantive basis for delineating law from fact are conceptually sound in
the abstract, but often fail to account for the real-world practice of courts.
Conversely, existing consequentialist approaches dissatisfy in their inability to
prescribe a principled, normatively sound basis for classifying issues across
subject matter areas.
But approaching the law-fact distinction from a procedural justice
perspective offers a new and compelling account both for describing the lawfact case law and for prescribing how the classification of issues (i.e., the
application of the law-fact distinction) can serve normatively desirable ends.
At the foundational level, procedural justice sees the competency and
reputation of the institution tasked with resolving an adjudicative dispute of
central importance in ensuring that process—rather than substantive
outcomes—can serve as the basis for legitimizing outcomes.175 That is,
procedural justice demands that parties share an acknowledgment that the
tribunal in which they will present their arguments is competent and fair. If an
adjudicative dispute is to be resolved by an inappropriate institution, mere
participation or procedures will fail to sufficiently spur the parties on to accept
as legitimate the outcome that the legal process recommends.176 Importantly,
(2016) (“There were certainly a number of contributing causes including the decline of legal ‘formalism,’ the
rise of legal ‘realism,’ the evolution of the modern regulatory state, and the desire to coordinate legal regimes in
an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world.”).
175
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (plurality opinion) (recognizing
that court’s legitimacy is “a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of
the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands”); TOM R. TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 73 (1990) (“People may believe specific decisions are wrong, even wrongheaded,
and individual judges unworthy of their offices and still continue to support the court if they respect it as an
institution that is generally impartial, just and competent.” (quoting Walter Murphy & Joseph F. Tanenhaus,
Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court: A Preliminary Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court
Legitimation of Regime Changes, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 275 (Joel B. Grossman & Joseph
Tanenhaus eds., 1969))).
176
Indeed, one can catch glimpses of this phenomenon by observing that state courts have long been
deemed inappropriate institutions to resolve certain disputes between in-state citizens and an out-of-state
defendants given the outsized risk that the in-state citizens’ interests will be unfairly prioritized. Congress
responded to the risk of illegitimate dispute resolution in state courts by enabling out-of-state defendants to
remove certain cases to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
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then, ensuring that parties have the ability to present their claims and defenses
before a competent institution is central to preserving the legitimacy of
adjudication.177 And as suggested, the classification of issues is the means to
achieve that end. Certain issues might demand resolution by a jury of one’s
peers, others might see resolution via judicial pronouncement as preferable;
certain issues might demand deferential appellate oversight, others might require
de novo review. In recognition of this phenomenon, courts can use the
classification process—the categorization of an issue as either a question of law
or a question of fact—to ensure that issues are delegated to the institution best
suited to provide a response that will be accepted as legitimate by the parties and
public at large. Whereas the traditional law-fact model would see the
classification of issues as internal, in that the appropriate categorization is
entirely dependent on the inherent qualities of the question at hand, the
procedural justice model sees classification as an external process, primarily
dependent on and constrained by the legitimating strengths of the would-be
decision makers. Stated simply, procedural justice principles can and should
motivate the law-fact distinction.
But how does it actually work? How does the issue classification process
operate if procedural justice is indeed its driving force? The answer is intuitive
in the abstract, yet deeply substantive in application.
To begin, procedural justice demands that classification commence with
antecedent knowledge of the relative strengths and legitimating potential of
would-be decision makers. Because the overarching goal of the procedural
justice framework is to use labels as a means of facilitating juridical legitimacy,
a classifier must possess deep appreciation for the legitimating competencies of
potential decision makers to ensure that the vesting of decision-making authority
with a particular institution will foster, rather than inhibit, the fairness of an
issue’s resolution. To be sure, legitimacy is itself a nuanced concept with
numerous potential manifestations. But in the procedural justice space,
preeminent scholars speak of verdict legitimacy in terms of popular social
acceptability.178 Professor Charles Nesson suggests, for instance, that legitimacy
is not wholly tied to decisional accuracy (although accuracy, of course, plays

177
See Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, supra note 48, at 30 (“People bring their disputes to the
court because they view judges as neutral, principled decision makers who make decisions based upon rules and
not personal opinions, and who apply legal rules consistently across people and over cases.”).
178
See, e.g., Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985). This form of legitimacy aims to achieve “verdicts that the public will
view as statements about what actually happened, which the legal system can then use as predicates for imposing
sanctions without further considering the evidence on which the verdicts were based.” Id. at 1358.
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into the social acceptability of a verdict) but is instead primarily dependent on
the “appearance of justice.”179 This perception of legitimacy accords with
procedural justice scholar Tom Tyler, who sees legitimacy tied to perceived
fairness in the manner in which cases are decided.180 So, stated simply,
classifiers must know what the public sees as fair in the context of adjudication.
In which institutions (and to what degree) do litigants see an ability to adequately
voice their concerns? In which contexts do institutions benefit from perceptions
of neutrality, respect, and public trust? Answering these questions requires deep
familiarity with the existing normative and empirical literature. Of course, a
legal institution’s decision-making legitimacy—its ability to produce fair
outcomes—is context-dependent, varying widely based on the demands of
different questions and evolving over time.181 Yet procedural justice demands
familiarity with these shifting sands.
With the requisite institutional familiarity in hand, issue classification then
requires something akin to a sorting or matching process. That is, the
epistemological, moral, and societal demands of particular issues must be
assessed against the competencies and legitimating potential of would-be
decision makers. For certain issues, fairness and legitimacy might depend
primarily on decision-maker status. In the criminal context, for instance,
resolution of issues by a cross-section of the community is often preferable to
judicial resolution, even if courts might be able to reach more principled,
uniform, or even factually accurate decisions.182 The fairness and legitimacy of
resolutions to other issues, though, might depend not on status, but on a decision
maker’s ability to persuade or on its ability to distribute justice evenly across a
wide range of alike cases.183 Still other issues might demand a hybrid of these

179

Id. at 1391.
See TYLER, supra note 175. Tyler notes that “[p]eople may believe specific decisions are wrong, even
wrongheaded, and individual judges unworthy of their offices and still continue to support the court if they
respect it as an institution that is generally impartial, just and competent.” Id. (quoting Murphy & Tanenhaus,
supra note 108).
181
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (plurality opinion); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of
THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE . . . that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority.”).
182
See Emil J. Bove III, Note, Preserving the Value of Unanimous Criminal Jury Verdicts in AntiDeadlock Instructions, 97 GEO. L.J. 251, 267 (2008) (“A unanimous criminal jury verdict affixes a stamp of
legitimacy to the outcome of the criminal process.”).
183
The relationship between coherence and the legitimacy of the rule of law has deep roots, meaning that
judicial decision making might not just be preferable but essential in certain instances. Aristotle first identified
the principle as central to the notion of justice, and many contemporary theorists and legal philosophers,
including Ronald Dworkin, Lon Fuller, H.L.A. Hart, and John Rawls, have recognized that coherence (or a like
principle) is an essential component for preserving the legitimacy of legal actors’ decisions. See ARISTOTLE,
THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 80–101 (David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2009) (c. 384 B.C.E.); H.L.A. HART,
180
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factors, as occurs in the administrative and intellectual property space where
legitimate resolution requires persuasive reasoning from subject matter
experts.184 Because the overarching goal of the procedural justice framework is
to use labels to facilitate adjudicative legitimacy, classifying issues requires
appreciation for both the institutional consequences that will follow from the
application of a label and the legitimating potential of that institutional treatment
when reconciled with public norms of fairness—norms that lie at the heart of the
procedural justice movement.
Consider an animating example by returning to the issue of “reasonability”
as it manifests in the policing context. Recall that, in § 1983 civil lawsuits
against officers for the use of excessive force, the Supreme Court has held that
the reasonability of an officer’s actions, or whether an alleged victim’s actions
rise to a level warranting deadly force, is a “pure question of law.”185
Importantly, though, Scott v. Harris, the Supreme Court decision declaring
reasonability in the policing context a question of law, provides no support for
that particular classification.186 It neither relies on an articulated transsubstantive law-fact line of demarcation that plainly sees policing
reasonableness a question of law, nor does it seek to reconcile its classification
with Sioux City & Pacific Railroad v. Stout’s earlier holding that reasonability

THE CONCEPT OF LAW 6–25 (1961) (identifying the principle within the Nicomachean Ethics); RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 164–67 (1986); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 64–90 (1964); JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235 (1971). As suggested, then, “[t]he fact that coherence cannot be taken for granted has
significant implications for institutional design. It suggests, in some domains, a possible reason to favor judicial
decisions over jury decisions, because judges are more likely to have a menu of cases before them.” Cass R.
Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Ilana Ritova, Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 1153, 1156–57 (2002). Whereas the judiciary is able to achieve coherent and socially acceptable decisions
by engaging in reasoned elaboration aimed at achieving a balance of “consistency and coherence,” juries largely
deliberate in isolation, a practice susceptible to producing “a pattern of outcomes that they would themselves
reject, if only they could see that pattern as a whole.” Id. at 1153, 1155.
184
For example, modern criminal courtrooms increasingly see defendants charged with crimes that
reference technical elements that overlap with the competencies of administrative agencies. For example, 18
U.S.C. § 2339B criminalizes the act of “provid[ing] material support and resources to a foreign terrorist
organization.” Rather than delegating the responsibility of determining whether the recipient of aid was indeed
a foreign terrorist organization to the judge or jury, courts have largely deferred to the judgment of the Secretary
of State, noting that only the “the fact of an organization’s designation as an FTO is an element of § 2339B,”
but neither judge nor jury could make an inquest into the “validity of the designation.” United States v.
Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 331 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (emphasis omitted), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S.
1097 (2005). Where technical questions present epistemological demands that fall squarely within the core
competencies of administrative agencies, the legitimacy of those agencies as adjudicators seems to be increasing.
185
See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007) (“[T]he reasonableness of [an officer’s] actions—
or . . . ‘[w]hether [respondent’s] actions have risen to a level warranting deadly force’—is a pure question of
law.” (internal citation omitted)).
186
See id. (providing no support for the classification of reasonableness in the policing context as a
question of law).
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in the tort context is a pure question of fact.187 Rather, mere ipse dixit supports
the Court’s classification. Such ad hoc classification, especially for such an
important societal issue, invites skepticism.188 Yet, in the murky twilight zone
of the law-fact binary, there is little more the Court can do.
The procedural justice classification model, though, changes the debate.
Rather than limiting argumentation to metaphysical claims about the inherent
legal or factual nature of “reasonability” in its various manifestations, notions of
fairness and legitimacy become the currency of the realm. The shift pushes
litigants to ground their briefs in practical and pragmatic arguments. For
example, in this context, one might first turn to a robust empirical literature
detailing the relationship between procedural fairness and legitimate policing.189
This literature demonstrates that, in the policing context, “legitimacy develops
from and is maintained by the fair exercise of authority on the part of the police
when they deal with the public—that is, through the provision of procedural
justice.”190 Stated differently, legitimate policing requires a public perception
that the conduct regulations guiding officers are fair.191 Scholars have in turn
recognized that one important factor (among others) in ensuring that policing
guidelines are indeed seen as “fair” is the existence of a robust accountability
system.192 “Effective accountability procedures are essential if the police are to
achieve their goals of lawfulness and legitimacy[.]”193 And, increasingly, there’s
a public demand for accountability that flows not from internal sources—not
from some actor within the legal system—but from the community itself. That
is, “[a]n important and very relevant aspect of public accountability is whether
187

See Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873).
When the judiciary fails to satisfy its “obligation to succeed” and “a serious gap between persuasion
and authority emerges, there can be genuine political crisis.” PAUL W. KAHN, MAKING THE CASE: THE ART OF
THE JUDICIAL OPINION 39 (2016) (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 239 (2d ed. 1986)); see BICKEL, supra, at 71.
189
See Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference Between Lawful or Effective Policing
and Rightful Policing—and Why It Matters, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1865 (2013); Tracey L. Meares, Tom R.
Tyler & Jacob Gardener, Lawful or Fair? How Cops and Laypeople View Good Policing, 105 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 297 (2016).
190
ROBERT E. WORDEN & SARAH J. MCLEAN, MIRAGE OF POLICE REFORM: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND
POLICE LEGITIMACY 44 (2017) (quoting Tom R. Tyler, Phillip Atiba Goff & Robert J. MacCoun, The Impact of
Psychological Science on Policing in the United States: Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Effective Law
Enforcement, 16 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INT. 75, 75 (2015)).
191
See Tom R. Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 84, 92
(2004) (“[P]eople’s willingness to buy into and voluntarily accept decisions that may require them to accept
outcomes that they do not want, or to engage in self-control over their actions, is enhanced by the judgment that
one has been treated fairly by the police.”).
192
See SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: CURRENT ISSUES AND RESEARCH NEEDS 1–2 (2006),
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/218583.pdf.
193
Id. at 1.
188
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there is an element of representation.”194 For example, over the last fifty years,
there’s emerged a growing chorus of citizen oversight agencies “demand[ing]
external procedures for reviewing citizen complaints, arguing that they will be
more effective than internal police complaint review procedures.”195 In 1970,
there was only 1 such oversight agency nationwide; that number grew to 38 by
1990 and over 100 by 2001.196 Despite these efforts, however, surveys
demonstrate that the empirical ideal has not yet been actualized: “No [existing]
external citizen oversight agency has the power to impose discipline of officers
against whom complaints are sustained.”197
Given this empirical landscape, the classification of the policing
reasonability issue carries added weight. As a “question of fact,” the
reasonability question can be handed to the jury, an institution that—again
according to empirical studies—benefits from a public perception of trust given
its status as a proxy for community sentiment. As a “question of law,” however,
the reasonability issue is of course handed to judges to decide. Delegating
authority over assessing police actions to a governmental actor, instead of a
cross-section of the community, seems to counteract the pursuit of optimal
procedural justice by limiting participation in accountability.
The initial insight gleaned from empirical studies also seems supported by
the normative side of the procedural justice literature. Beginning, first, at the
most intuitive level, consider an illustrative example of the normative
dimensions of procedural justice offered by Lawrence Solum’s aforementioned
article.198 Imagine that two individuals decide to share a dessert, but they first
want to agree on a fair means of dividing the treat.199 So, the two individuals
create a rule—one will slice the dessert into two pieces, but the other will have
first choice of which piece she receives. Both parties accept the outcome as
legitimate because they perceive the process that actualized it as fair. But what
exactly rendered the process fair? One might say that the rule is designed to
ensure accuracy, or perhaps the rule strikes a fair compromise between accuracy
and the cost that would accompany trying to precisely divide the dessert.200 Or,
perhaps still, the division of the treat was fair because each party participated in
194
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK ON POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, OVERSIGHT AND
INTEGRITY 103 (2011); cf. Solum, supra note 141, at 275 (“[A] right of participation is essential for the
legitimacy of a final and binding civil proceeding.”).
195
See WALKER, supra note 192, at 3.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 20.
198
See Solum, supra note 141.
199
As noted, Lawrence Solum advances this example in his excellent article. Id. at 238–39.
200
Id. at 238.
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final outcome—the slicer cannot complain about receiving a smaller share since
she did the dividing; the chooser cannot complain about selecting the smaller
piece.201 Scholars have examined each of these different models when
explaining the relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy.202 But the
final model—the participation model—is especially salient in the policing
context. Solum suggests that “[p]rocedures that purport to bind without
affording meaningful rights of participation are fundamentally illegitimate.”203
As relevant here, then, affording procedural participation rights to those within
the policed jurisdiction is perhaps an essential step toward greater procedural
justice and, in turn, police legitimacy.204 Policed communities are increasingly
demanding that police misbehavior be checked by external accountability
systems—systems that include members of the public.205 That is, policed
communities seek participation in the mechanisms that will hold misbehaving
officers accountable. Norms of procedural justice seem to support this move,
even as the legitimating participation in this context comes not from the
aggrieved individual directly but rather from her community acting as a proxy
for her interests.206 Mirroring Solum’s dessert example, greater community
participation in the review of claims of police misconduct would create
beneficial incentives for all actors. Police become directly accountable to the
citizens they serve; citizens, in turn, should more readily accept police action as
legitimate if it is sanctioned by members of their own community. Adopting Lon
Fuller’s assessment of adjudicative legitimacy, public participation in police
accountability mechanisms offers the “capacity to reorient the parties toward
each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new
and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their
attitudes and dispositions toward one another.”207
Again, deeming the reasonability issue in the § 1983 context a question of
fact furthers this end. With the excessive force question delegated to the jury,
the community becomes the arbiter of what constitutes reasonable police action.
While judicial pronouncement invites skepticism from traditional out-groups
201

Id. at 238–39.
See id. at 239. The first two responses would roughly correspond to what Solum (and Rawls before
him) describe as “perfect” and “imperfect” procedural justice. Id. at 242–73.
203
Id. at 274.
204
In fact, at an instinctual level, the desire for such rights is readily observable in modern debates around
policing.
205
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 194 (“An important and very relevant aspect of public
accountability is whether there is an element of representation.”).
206
See Solum, supra note 141, at 236 n.137.
207
Lon L. Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 (1971); see Markovits,
supra note 150, at 1395.
202
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facing an adverse substantive decision, jury decisions place the decision-making
authority in the hands of the plaintiff’s own community.208
Ultimately, despite the advocacy above, the goal of this exercise is not to
offer a firm declaration that the reasonability question must be deemed factual
or legal. One could also likely find empirical and normative arguments as to why
vesting the excessive force question with the judiciary better facilitates
procedural justice. For example, as hinted above, the legitimating participatory
potential of jury oversight in the § 1983 context heavily depends on how well
the aggrieved sees the jury as “participating” in the system on her behalf.209 But
the exercise does illustrate how the classification debate benefits by pinning the
law-fact distinction to principles of procedural justice. Argumentation over the
appropriate label, and intentional consideration of the implications of that
decision, becomes principled and accessible. Despite the law-fact
indeterminacy, the classification process remains bounded and motivated by a
clear, normative end.
Taking stock, then, in its operationalized form, the procedural justice
classification model expects a fundamental shift in the debate surrounding the
classification of issues. Rather than requiring metaphysical arguments over the
makeup of an issue’s existential substance, the model expects classification
driven by pragmatic, practical considerations of institutional competency and
perceptions of legitimacy. Hereto, courts have been loath to affirmatively
endorse consideration of the consequences of classification as a component of
the classification process itself.210 And, if one accepts traditional accounts of the
law-fact distinction, this judicial reluctance perhaps makes sense. After all, it
would be odd to classify a fruit as an apple or an orange by considering where it
would be placed in a store were either label applied. An apple is an apple because
of its inherent nature, regardless of what happens to the fruit once appropriately
classified. So, too, it would make little sense for a traditionalist, believing in a
firm law-fact line of demarcation, to look past the four corners of an issue when
classifying it. Yet, when trust in those formalist accounts begins to wane—when
confidence in the existence of a theoretical law-fact line of demarcation begins
to slip—a legal system generally opposed to one-off, ad hoc declarations

208
See Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1775 (“[J]urors as representatives of the community, rather than
judges, are better equipped to make [reasonableness] decisions.”).
209
The primary focus of the existing normative literature examines how individual participation, not proxy
participation by community members, fosters legitimacy. See Solum, supra note 141; Fuller, supra note 207;
Markovits, supra note 150, at 1395.
210
Although, Part II.B demonstrates that courts have already operationalized considerations of procedural
justice as a central component of the issue classification process.
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requires a principled trans-substantive basis for issue classification and
allocation. The procedural justice model provides just that. It constrains and
motivates issue classification by seeing classification as a means—indeed, a
central driver—for achieving the normative ends pursued by the procedural
justice school.
Of course, by now, one might fairly wonder—if the law-fact distinction is
illusory, why retain the existing classification regime at all? Why not abandon
the “question of fact” and “question of law” labels entirely and instead shift to a
regime that offers bespoke institutional treatment to individual issues depending
on their unique demands?
Admittedly, if path dependency and existing legal infrastructure were no
obstacle, reinventing the classification regime anew—transforming it into a
transparent delegation regime—is perhaps preferable. But law does not develop
in a vacuum. This Article offers not an ideal solution, but a second-best path
forward given the non-ideal reality.
Even if courts recognize that adopting the procedural justice model for
classifying issues is normatively desirable, fully abandoning the labels “question
of law” and “question of fact” might not constitute the best path forward. In fact,
much of courtroom practice in the modern legal system is not the product of an
invariable pursuit of optimal institutional design.211 The jury system did not gain
mainstream acceptance because of a persistent belief that, relative to its
alternatives, jury deliberation in its modern form constitutes the most accurate
or effective form of truth-seeking.212 Likewise, the modern emphasis on witnesscentric testimony in the courtroom does not necessarily depend on some notion
that it will always constitute the best means of exploring evidentiary claims at
trial.213 Rather, these courtroom practices continue to occupy a prominent place
at trial because they are products of history,214 vestiges of the past that have
become entrenched in the Anglo-American juridical system.215 Centuries of use
have bred a deep social familiarity with these cornerstones of the courtroom, and
there exists a form of institutional path dependency that best explains the

211
See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng & G. Alexander Nunn, Beyond the Witness: Bringing a Process Perspective
to Modern Evidence Law, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1077 (2019).
212
Indeed, empirical studies suggest that skepticism about the epistemological ability of juries lingers even
today. See JOHN A. MURLEY & SEAN D. SUTTON, THE SUPREME COURT AGAINST THE CRIMINAL JURY: SOCIAL
SCIENCE AND THE PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY (2014).
213
See Cheng & Nunn, supra note 211, at 1083–84.
214
Id. at 1084
215
See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 47.
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continued viability of many institutional mechanisms within the modern legal
system.216
Importantly, institutional entrenchment does not negate the possibility of
radical change in the courtroom. It does, however, alter the means by which
change can be most easily effected. In a juridical system in which legitimacy is
often tied to centuries-old practices, institutional restructuring is most easily
implemented when the nominal form of a practice is preserved, but its function
is gradually evolved to achieve some superior purpose. Where accomplished,
evolutionary development strikes an ideal balance, capturing the instrumental
gains made possible by the internal reorientation without fully sacrificing the
legitimating force of the vestigial practice.
Consider, for example, the evolutionary development of the jury system. As
initially constituted, the early jury was a radically different institution than its
modern descendant. Pursuant to the Assize of Clarendon in 1166, the original
twelfth-century jury was a self-informed group, composed of members living in
the same close-knit agrarian community as the accused.217 Although, by modern
standards, juror pre-knowledge of adjudicative facts is anathema, close
proximity of jury members and the accused was initially seen as normatively
desirable—early jurors’ position in the community offered practical efficiency
gains as they were the individuals in the best position to uncover the necessary
facts.218 Thus, unlike its modern passive role, the “early jury was expected to
have pre-trial knowledge of the events at issue and come ‘upon oath’ to trials to
speak as to whether anyone in their area was ‘accused’ or ‘notoriously
suspect[ed]’ of certain serious offenses—including murder, robbery, theft, or
harboring.”219 Effectively, then, the early jury operated in both a prosecutorial
and adjudicative role.220 But the following centuries would demand a radical
reinvention of this early model. The Black Death rendered open-field agriculture
nonviable as a drastic drop in population pushed communal workers toward a
new era of independent, enclosure-based farming.221 Communal life within the
vill, the essential predicate for the self-informing jury, gradually faded.222 The
216

See id.
See id. at 244; Cheng & Nunn, supra note 211, at 1084.
218
See John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1169–72 (1996); C.S. & C.S. ORWIN, THE OPEN FIELDS 36–62 (1938) (describing the
socioeconomic conditions into which the jury system was born).
219
Cheng & Nunn, supra note 211, at 1084 (quoting 2 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS: 1042–1189, at
440–41 (David C. Douglas & G.W. Greenaway eds., 2d ed. 1981)).
220
See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 224; Langbein, supra note 218, at 1170.
221
See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 224–27.
222
Cheng & Nunn, supra note 211, at 1084.
217
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original jury was in danger of extinction, as “[w]ithout the village, the jury, as
contemporaries knew it, would have been impossible.”223 Yet, evolution
prevented obsolescence. Beginning in the fourteenth century, juries began to
undergo significant changes with respect to their composition, responsibilities,
and purpose.224 The jury’s initial proactive, self-informing prosecutorial
function faded away as passive, evaluative responsibilities became the new
norm. It became ignorant and instructional, receiving indictments from career
prosecutors who assumed responsibility over pre-trial investigations.225
Importantly, though, the jury itself survived, presumably because the benefits of
preserving the vestigial legitimacy associated with the institution outweighed
any instrumental gains to be had from entirely reworking the dispute resolution
system. The jury’s function evolved but its form remained.226
The law-fact distinction is ripe for a similar evolution. The turbulent case
law demonstrates that the continual attempts to identify a formal ground for
distinguishing questions of law from questions of fact are futile errands.227 That
said, the purported division between legal and factual inquiries continues to have
instrumental value given its prevalence—indeed entrenchment—in our legal
system. For centuries, judges have delegated issues and applied standards of
review on the basis of an issue being a “question of fact” or “question of law.”228
Rather than completely reinventing the classification system, courts might
therefore determine that the best path forward is to preserve the existing labels
but to assign them using the procedural justice framework here advanced. The
law-fact distinction’s form would remain, but its function would be reimagined.
Pulling these threads together, this evolutionary approach to implementation
of the procedural justice model ultimately asks a classifier to discern which
existing label—“question of law” or “question of fact”—will most closely afford
an issue the optimal institutional treatment (measured against norms of
procedural justice). Of course, given the rigidity of the traditional classification
system, there will be instances in which the institutional treatment offered by the

223
R.B. Goheen, Peasant Politics? Village Community and the Crown in Fifteenth Century England, 96
AM. HIST. REV. 42, 53 (1991).
224
See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 208.
225
See id.; Daniel Klerman, Was the Jury Ever Self-Informing?, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 123, 124 (2003).
226
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes described a similar process with respect to the substance of the law
itself, noting “the social end which is aimed at by a rule of law is obscured and only partially attained in
consequence of the fact that the rule owes its form to a gradual historical development, instead of being reshaped
as a whole, with conscious articulate reference to the end in view.” Holmes, supra note 120, at 469.
227
See supra Part I.
228
E.g., Isack v. Clark, 1 ROLLE 127, 132 (1613) (“[A]d questionem facti non respondent jurisperiti, ad
questionem juris non respondent juratores . . . .”).
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question of law and question of fact labels falls short of achieving the identified
optimum. But this is the tradeoff of the evolutionary system. On the margins,
the importance of ensuring that each issue is afforded the optimal institutional
treatment is outweighed by the instrumental and legitimating value reaped from
preserving the traditional labels. In a variant of Justice Holmes’ famous words,
it can be said that “[t]he social end which is aimed at by [the evolutionary
approach to implementing the procedural justice model] is obscured and only
partially attained in consequence of the fact that the [evolutionary approach
commits] its form to a gradual historical development, instead of being reshaped
as a whole, with conscious articulate reference to the end in view.”229 The goals
of facilitating procedural justice and maximizing the legitimacy of the rule of
law still drive the classification of issues, but their complete fulfillment is
marginally sacrificed to ease implementation and administration of the model.
B. How the Model Informs
The procedural justice model offers an intuitive yet robust theoretical
account for the motivation of and constraints on the law-fact distinction. Yet, in
contrast to many traditional accounts, the model is not merely isolated within
the realm of theory. Rather, case law demonstrates that courts have already been
turning to principles of institutional competency and legitimacy—principles at
the heart of the procedural justice model—when classifying hard issues.230 Even
without candidly endorsing the model, they often use its core tenets to drive their
opinions.
At the same time, case law also demonstrates that courts still cling (at least
nominally) to the traditional conception of the law-fact distinction as a
distinction in theoretical kinds. In some cases, for example, issues are deemed
factual because they involve historical reconstruction; issues are deemed legal
because they involve normative or moral calculations.231 The Supreme Court’s
recent decision in U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC
reiterates the Court’s purported endorsement of a classification system that sees
questions of fact encompassing “questions of who did what, when or where, how
or why,” and the “unalloyed” category of questions of law encompassing issues
that require establishing more normative societal rules.232

229

Holmes, supra note 120, at 469.
See Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1778–89 (identifying threads of pragmatic reasoning throughout
law-fact case law).
231
See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 960, 965–68 (2018).
232
Id. at 965–66 (citation omitted).
230
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But in other cases, the classification analysis is imbued with discussion about
the relative legitimating strengths of certain institutions and would-be decision
makers. Indeed, some opinions classify issues as questions of fact or questions
of law by exclusively relying on considerations of legitimacy and institutional
competence, completely forgoing any attempt to discern a theoretical distinction
between the two.
For an example of this latter phenomenon, return again to a favorite of
scholars—the Supreme Court’s decision in Sioux City & Pacific Railroad v.
Stout.233 The Stout Court determined that reasonableness in the negligence
context was a question of fact to be resolved by a jury.234 As scholars have
recognized, however, discussion about the theoretical differences between
questions of law and questions of fact is conspicuously absent from the Supreme
Court’s opinion.235 There is no claim that reasonableness should be deemed a
factual inquiry because it primarily involves reconstructive analysis of historical
events or because the evaluative components of reasonableness (at least,
reasonableness in the negligence context) lack some sort of legal tinge. Instead,
the Supreme Court’s classification of reasonableness is entirely dependent on
considerations of procedural fairness. Speaking the praises of the jury, the Court
noted that “twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does one
man[;] . . . they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus
occurring than can a single judge.”236 Contrary to the judiciary, the jury is
composed of an “average [cross-section] of the community, comprising men of
education and men of little education, men of learning and men whose learning
consists only in what they have themselves seen and heard, the merchant, the
mechanic, the farmer, the laborer.”237 The Supreme Court thus deemed the jury
better positioned to “apply their separate experience of the affairs of life to the
facts proven, and draw a unanimous conclusion” regarding the reasonability of
the defendant’s actions.238 In essence, then, the Supreme Court saw resolution
through jury decision making as a fairer procedure for litigants, especially given
the jury’s unique status.
Although Stout is an early case, it provides a clear window into how the
traditional conception of the law-fact distinction, despite its generally accepted
nature, often fails to drive the classification of issues. Of course, if there did exist
233
234
235
236
237
238

See Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657 (1873).
Id. at 665.
See, e.g., Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1778–89; Atiq, supra note 11.
See Stout, 84 U.S. at 664.
Id.
Id.
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a controlling formal ground for distinguishing questions of law from questions
of fact, we would expect Stout’s consideration of the relative legitimating
strengths of the jury to be largely irrelevant (or, at least only relevant insofar as
it confirms the conclusion that the traditional model would reach). But Stout sees
considerations of procedural justice and legitimacy as not only driving the
classification of reasonableness, but also serving as the exclusive basis for
deeming it a question of fact.239
To be sure, Stout is something of an exception. Most cases do not completely
forgo any attempt to distinguish legal and factual issues on theoretical grounds,
but instead couple a theoretical account with a complementary procedural justice
focus. For example, consider again another favorite case of scholars (particularly
Allen and Pardo)—Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.240
As noted, in Cooper, the Supreme Court determined that constitutional
challenges to punitive damages awards should be reviewed by appellate courts
akin to legal inquiries subject to a de novo standard.241 In reaching this
conclusion, the Cooper Court first noted that, unlike factual questions that
involve “historical or predictive fact[s],” such as an assessment of “the concrete
loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful
conduct,” the calculation of punitive damages has a legal character, in that, it
constitutes “an expression of . . . moral condemnation” and is “intended to
punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing.”242 Stated differently, then,
Cooper seems to draw a law-fact line of theoretical demarcation between those
issues that require pure historical reconstruction and those that involve moral or
normative judgments. In so acting, however, the Court seems to trample (or at
least create an inconsistency with) a number of its previous decisions.243 Noting
that a “jury’s verdict on punitive damages is fundamentally dependent on
determinations [that the Court] characterize[s] as factfindings,” Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent questioned how the Cooper rationale could explain the
classification of so-called questions of fact, including “the extent of harm or
potential harm caused by the defendant’s misconduct, whether the defendant
acted in good faith, whether the misconduct was an individual instance or part
of a broader pattern, [and] whether the defendant behaved negligently,
recklessly, or maliciously.”244 Indeed, applying the Cooper framework would
239

See id.
See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001); Allen & Pardo, supra note
6, at 1773–78.
241
Cooper, 532 U.S. at 431 (“We . . . conclude that the constitutional issue merits de novo review.”).
242
Id. at 432, 437 (citations omitted).
243
See id. at 446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Allen & Pardo, supra note 6, at 1774.
244
Cooper, 532 U.S. at 446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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lead to a contrary decision in Stout, as assessments of the reasonability of a
defendant’s actions rely more heavily on “an expression of . . . moral
condemnation” designed to “punish the defendant and to deter future
wrongdoing” than any “historical or predictive” assessment of “concrete
facts.”245
Perhaps given the muddled nature of this purported theoretical distinction,
the Cooper Court then turned to consider how the calculation of punitive
damages should be classified in light of “[d]ifferences in the institutional
competence of trial judges and appellate judges.”246 Balancing the relative
legitimating strengths of the potential decision makers, the Court noted that trial
courts only possess a “somewhat superior” position (relative to appellate courts)
in assessing “the degree or reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct.”247
Conversely, appellate courts were deemed “more suited” to determine “the
difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”248 The Supreme Court
therefore determined that principles of procedural and distributive justice
warranted the classification of the calculation of punitive damages as a quasilegal inquiry deserving of de novo appellate review.249 Thus, although Cooper
differs from Stout in at least attempting to advance a theoretical ground for
distinguishing questions of law from questions of fact, it seems apparent that
procedural fairness considerations weighed most heavily on its analysis. Of the
two rationales given to justify the Court’s classification, one directly
contradicted past cases; the other contributed to a growing trend of classification
as a means of facilitating adjudicative legitimacy.
The tug-of-war between the traditional and procedural justice
conceptualizations of the law-fact distinction is further evinced by a series of
cases in which questions once deemed factual were reclassified as legal.
Consider, for instance, the Supreme Court’s decision in Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad v. Goodman,250 in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated
his well-known “stop, look, and listen” standard of care.251 Goodman required
the Court to examine a jury verdict in favor of a truck driver who was hit by a

245

Id. at 432, 437 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
Id. at 440.
247
Id.
248
Id. (citation omitted).
249
See id.
250
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
251
Jason M. Solomon, Juries, Social Norms, and Civil Justice, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1125, 1154 (2014)
(“Holmes formulated what would be known as the ‘stop, look, and listen’ rule.”).
246
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train at a railway crossing.252 As noted, determinations of reasonable care and
contributory negligence had been historically classified as factual matters for
resolution by the jury.253 But in Goodman, Justice Holmes stepped in and
reversed course, declaring, as a matter of law, that the driver could not recover
because he failed to “stop and look” at the intersection.254 Effectively, Justice
Holmes relabeled a factual issue bound for the jury a legal issue properly
resolved by a judge.255 As in Stout and Cooper, however, the impetus for
relabeling the question was emphatically not a suggestion that the Court had
achieved better insight regarding the true nature or intrinsic qualities of the
negligence question; instead, Goodman demonstrates that the reclassification
was driven almost entirely by concerns of procedural justice and legitimacy.
Justice Holmes insisted that the negligence issue should be deemed a question
of law because of a pressing need for a clear standard, a standard that could only
be “laid down once for all by the Courts.”256 The focus was not on whether the
intrinsic nature of the appropriate care inquiry primarily required historical
reconstructive analysis—whether it was primarily a “question[] of who did what,
when or where, how or why”257 or instead required some other epistemological
approach—but instead on considerations of the procedural fairness implicated
by delegation to different would-be decision makers.
In many ways, the Court’s reluctance to candidly embrace a procedural
justice classification regime might also explain the rise of mixed questions of
law and fact. As detailed by the Supreme Court, a mixed question of law and
fact requires a decision maker to determine how a law or legal doctrine applies
to a specific universe of facts.258 Categorically, it is somewhat unclear how
mixed questions of law and fact fit within the traditional law-fact paradigm. On
one view, mixed questions might present an epistemologically distinct type of
issue that sits between pure questions of law and pure questions of fact in a
triadic model. Case law, however, fails to demonstrate that bright lines, or any
other formal ground, exist between pure questions of law and mixed questions
of law and fact. As discussed, the reasonability of a police officer’s use of force
252

Goodman, 275 U.S. at 69.
Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873) (deeming negligence a question of fact
because, inter alia, “twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does one man, [so] they can draw
wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge”).
254
Goodman, 275 U.S. at 70.
255
See id.
256
Id. (citation omitted)
257
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 960, 966 (2018) (citation omitted).
258
See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982) (A mixed question asks whether “the
historical facts . . . satisfy the statutory standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to
the established facts is or is not violated”).
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is entirely dependent on the factual contours of an underlying incident—that is,
it requires a decision maker to apply the concept of reasonability to a factual
conflict—yet is deemed a “pure question of law.”259 On a second view, then,
perhaps mixed questions of law and fact might be distinguished from pure
questions of law (or fact) not based on their epistemological differences, but
instead based on the proximity of the factual and legal questions. Mixed
questions of law and fact might simply constitute issues for which pure questions
of law can only be answered by first establishing a necessary factual predicate.
Again, however, this alternative conceptualization fails to square with case law,
as issues such as maliciousness and recklessness reside at junctures where
normative and factual inquiries overlap, yet are deemed pure questions of fact.260
Under the procedural justice approach to classification, however, a more
plausible explanation for the initial emergence and modern prominence of the
mixed question category emerges. Mixed questions are simply an outgrowth of
the traditional model’s failure to advance a coherent distinction. As the two
traditional categories—pure questions of law and pure questions of fact—failed
to encapsulate the entire universe of adjudicative issues within their scope, the
mixed question category arose to capture those issues that fell within that murky
middle ground—the aforementioned law-fact twilight zone.261 At the same time,
the mixed question label also offers an attractive opportunity for courts seeking
to delegate issues to the institutional decision maker best able to provide a
legitimate resolution. For example, in U.S. Bank National Ass’n, the Supreme
Court expressly recognized that mixed questions are malleable enough to be
utilized as a means of delegating decision-making authority over an issue to an
appropriate institution.262 Noting that “[m]ixed questions are not all alike,” the
Court determined that “appellate courts [as opposed to trial courts] should
typically review a decision” that requires “courts to expound on the law,
259

See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007).
See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 446 (2001) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (noting that, under Supreme Court precedent, “whether the defendant behaved negligently,
recklessly, or maliciously” is a form of “factfinding[]”).
261
See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
262
See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. at 966–69. In U.S. Bank National Ass’n, the Court summarily
noted that the issue of whether a creditor qualifies as a “non-statutory” insider for the purpose of Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceedings is a mixed question of law and fact. Id. at 965–66. The short discussion regarding the
proper classification of the issue again demonstrated a purported reliance on the traditional conceptualization of
the law-fact distinction. See id. Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, noted that a question of fact involves
“questions of who did what, when or where, how or why.” Id. at 966 (citation omitted). Conversely, she noted
that the “unalloyed” category of questions of law includes those issues that require establishing more normative
societal rules, such as discerning the appropriate test for “determin[ing] whether someone is a non-statutory
insider.” Id. at 965. Finally, Justice Kagan briefly introduced the mixed question category, but failed to
distinguish it from the other categories in any formal way. See id. at 966.
260
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particularly by amplifying or elaborating on a broad legal standard,” given their
superior ability in “developing auxiliary legal principles of use in other cases.”263
Conversely, the Court determined that “appellate courts should usually review a
decision with deference” if a mixed question involves issues “compelling [a
factfinder] to marshal and weigh evidence, make credibility judgments, and
otherwise address . . . ’multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly
resist generalization.’”264 As demonstrated by U.S. Bank National Ass’n, then,
mixed questions of law and fact constitute an emerging pocket of procedural
justice reasoning; they offer a classification not based on any firm formal
distinction that sets them apart from the question of law or question of fact
categories, but instead one seemingly purposed at allowing courts to expressly
and directly consider procedural fairness in delegating decision-making
authority.
As one’s exploration of case law runs deeper, one’s recognition of the
theoretical wrestling match between the traditional and procedural justice
models grows ever stronger. As demonstrated by Stout, Cooper, and other key
cases, the turbulent case law surrounding the law-fact distinction can be seen as
a surface-level manifestation of a deeper struggle between two competing
classification frameworks. Although courts nominally champion the traditional
conception of questions of law and questions of fact as theoretically distinct,
their reasoning increasingly betrays that endorsement by exhibiting significant
reliance on considerations of institutional legitimacy.265 What emerges from this
underappreciated theoretical jostling is jurisprudential limbo, a contradictory
and largely incoherent doctrine fueled by fundamentally irreconcilable
conceptions of the law-fact distinction.
C. How the Model Reforms
There is a simple and elegant explanation for why courts infuse procedural
justice reasoning into the law-fact case law—procedural justice provides a more
principled and desirable framework for classifying issues than does elusive (and
perhaps illusory) formal reasoning. Not only does the procedural justice law-fact
model seek to achieve normatively sound ends by orienting the classification
process toward achieving systematic fairness and legitimacy, it also grounds and
clarifies argumentation surrounding the legal and factual issues. Rather than
requiring judges and lawyers to engage in the metaphysical exercise of parsing
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264
265

Id. at 967 (citation omitted).
Id. (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561–62 (1988)).
See Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. 424; Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657 (1873).
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abstract notions of law and fact, classification inquiries simply become about
procedural fairness.
But the procedural justice model does not merely seek an academic victory.
Its implications are not confined to the realm of theory. Rather, in pinning the
law-fact distinction to notions of fairness and legitimacy, the procedural justice
model offers significant real-world reform.
Consider, first, how the procedural justice model protects against
institutional self-aggrandizement. Despite its nominal claims of ex post
ignorance, the traditional law-fact model has historically served as an
instrumental tool for shifting the balance of power in the courtroom. Tracing its
path through Anglo-American history, the use of the law-fact distinction as a
judicial means of controlling juries is conspicuous: “From the seventeenth
century onward, English judges used the granting of new trial nominally to
enforce, but in reality to redraw, the fact/law line, thereby steadily reducing the
sphere of the jury.”266 While outwardly committing to an insistence that legal
and factual inquiries were separated by some theoretical barrier, English
common law judges simultaneously used the classification process to effect a
“progressive dethronement of the jury.”267 Take, for example, the development
of contract law. Before the nineteenth century, contractual issues were almost
exclusively left for resolution by the jury.268 Thereafter, however, “questions
that were previously left to common sense became the subject of legal
doctrine.”269 In 1818, Adams v. Lindsell articulated the mailbox rule;270 in 1892,
Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. set forth doctrine for public offers.271
Practically speaking, commentators widely agree that this legalization of
adjudicative questions was purposed at enlarging judicial influence: “It was the
judges . . . who decided what was law, and they used the device of ever more
detailed jury instructions, reinforced by the new trial system in cases of jury
resistance, to recast as law matters that had previously been left to jury
discretion.”272
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267

LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 449.
A.W.B. Simpson, The Horowitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 600

(1979).
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269

See id.
A.W. Brian Simpson, The Elusive Truth About Holmes, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2027, 2038 (1980) (book

review).
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Adams v. Lindsell (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250, 251; see LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 450.
Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1892] 1 QB 256 (Eng.); see LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 47, at

450.
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Of course, the law-fact distinction was only capable of such manipulation
because of stark theoretical infirmities in the traditional model. The judicial
power grab that marked the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was only possible
because there did not exist any trans-substantive framework that defined a
question of law and a question of fact, no firm and obvious law-fact barrier over
which activist judges could not cross. The judiciary relied on that illusory
theoretical distinction to enlarge its sphere of influence.273 Yet, even from this
early era when the classification process was used for questionable ends, one
can recognize its potential to achieve a normatively desirable goal―optimal
allocation of decision-making authority to facilitate procedural justice and
legitimate the rule of law.274
The procedural justice classification framework offers that reform. Doing
away with quixotic search for the “slippery”275 and “vexing”276 theoretical
distinction between questions of law and questions of fact, the alternative
framework here advanced sees classification transparently driven by an
overarching desire to see ultimate decision-making authority placed in the hands
of the institution best suited to provide a fair, legitimate resolution. Far from
acting as an opaque concept vulnerable to manipulation, full-scale adoption of
the procedural justice classification framework enables the law-fact distinction
to serve as a centrally important juncture of accessible argument. Its
indeterminacy is its strength in that classification becomes an exercise of
optimizing institutional legitimacy rather than a philosophical endeavor to
determine an issue’s hidden nature.277
The reform offered by the procedural justice model, though, extends far
beyond mere improvements to the classification process itself. Indeed, at the
core of the procedural justice model is the hope that classifying issues based on
considerations of fairness will ultimately help legitimize the substantive
outcomes. That is, by seeking to make adjudicative procedure as just as possible,
the model facilitates the legitimacy of outcomes in a morally pluralistic society
that will inevitably disagree about substance. Of course, with that purpose, the
273

See id.
Functionally, then, the law-fact distinction becomes a legal fiction. Lon Fuller noted that legal fictions
are lies that are not meant to deceive. LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 6 (1967). Instead, many legal fictions are
simply “false statement[s] recognized as having utility”; they are means of achieving a normatively desirable
result in legal system marked by undertheorization. Id. at 9. Blackstone, too, was of this mind, noting that legal
fictions can sometimes be “highly beneficial and useful.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 43 (1768).
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Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 110–11 (1995).
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Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982).
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See supra Part II.A.
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procedural justice model requires continual institutional introspection. If we are
truly committed to achieving a fair and just legal system, what changes to the
allocation of decision-making authority are necessary? Which issues currently
resolved by, say, judges should be delegated to juries (and vice versa)? Which
issues currently reviewed de novo warrant more deferential treatment?
Even a brief survey demonstrates potential benefits of this exercise. As
discussed above, courts currently hold decision-making authority to determine
the reasonability of police force in a § 1983 lawsuit. Does procedural justice
demand that a cross-section of the community make these determinations
instead, especially given the recent outcry for greater police accountability?278
Judges similarly possess decision-making authority over assessments of the
voluntariness of a suspect’s confession under police interrogation.279 Should it
instead be a jury—individuals from outside the legal system—deciding what
information a defendant offered freely and what she offered under duress?
Determining discriminatory intent is currently a question of fact delegated to
juries to decide.280 But in jurisdictions in which juries historically served as an
instrument of oppression against marginalized communities, would this issue
have been better handled by courts?281 Questions surrounding effective
assistance of counsel, probable cause for a search, and whether speech is obscene
are ripe for similar examination. Of course, the traditional law-fact model would
pay no attention to these considerations, instead grasping for a theoretical
foothold to distinguish each issue as factual or legal. The procedural justice
model, in contrast, sees these considerations of fairness and legitimacy as
driving classification.
Finally, in its truest form, the procedural justice model improves the legal
system by breaking free of the restraints imposed by the traditional law-fact
278
See, e.g., The Editorial Board, Opinion, How the Supreme Court Lets Cops Get Away with Murder,
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/opinion/Minneapolis-police-George-Floyd.
html.
279
See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1985) (“‘[V]oluntariness’ is a legal
question . . . . Although sometimes framed as an issue of ‘psychological fact,’ the dispositive question of the
voluntariness of a confession has always had a uniquely legal dimension.” (internal citation omitted)).
280
See, e.g., Edwards v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 892 F.2d 1442, 1447 (9th Cir. 1990) (“A finding of
discriminatory intent in a Title VII case is a question of fact and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.”
(citation omitted)).
281
See Peter Arenella, The Perils of TV Legal Punditry, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 36 n.16 (“Classic
examples of bad faith jury nullification occurred throughout the South during the civil rights movement in the
sixties where all-white juries acquitted white defendants of crimes committed against black and white civil rights
workers.”); Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the
Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 86 (1990) (“Following the second World War,
all-white juries continued to acquit white southerners who engaged in interracial violence.”).
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binary. It pushes adjudication toward optimal delegation of decision-making
authority, even where that delegation would be unorthodox (and therefore
largely unavailable) under the traditional system.282
Glimpses of this revolutionary approach are already emerging in our legal
system. Consider, first, the rise of the so-called constitutional facts doctrine.283
The constitutional facts doctrine targets evaluative issues closely tied to
constitutional rights, such as whether speech was motivated by “actual
malice”284 or whether an abortion restriction constitutes an “undue burden.”285
Traditionally, one might think these issues would be classified as questions of
fact (although, under the traditional regime, that is hard to say for certain286) and
subjected to the traditional corresponding treatment—juries would make
determinations about the existence vel non of these factors and appellate courts
would then deferentially review those findings. In recent decades, however,
courts broke free from that traditional allocative mold. Constitutional facts were
deemed to be so essential, so closely tied to one’s fundamental rights, that a
departure from the traditional classification regime became imperative. To
create a uniform and predictable system for defining substantive constitutional
rights—to achieve procedural justice—courts carved out an exception to the
traditional treatment afforded to questions of fact and instead determined that
constitutional facts are to be reviewed de novo “to prevent the idiosyncrasies of
a single judge or jury from having far-reaching legal effects.”287 Again,
considerations of procedural justice, rather than adherence to the traditional lawfact regime, drove this change.
The emergence of the Chevron doctrine also presents a radical departure
from the traditional treatment regime.288 Under the Chevron doctrine, an
administrative agency’s interpretation of certain ambiguous statutes is granted
deference by appellate courts due to the fact that “[j]udges are not experts in”
282
See Monaghan, supra note 36, at 234 (“To be sure, the categories of law and fact have traditionally
served an important regulatory function in distributing authority among various decision makers in the legal
system. But there is no imperative that a properly affixed characterization necessarily controls allocation of
functions.” (internal footnote omitted)).
283
For an excellent survey of the constitutional facts doctrine, see Adam Hoffman, Note, Corralling
Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in the Federal Appellate Courts, 50 DUKE L.J. 1427 (2001).
284
See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 487 (1984).
285
See, e.g., A Woman’s Choice-E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2002).
286
See supra Part I.
287
A Woman’s Choice-E. Side Women’s Clinic, 305 F.3d at 689.
288
See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833 (2001) (“The
Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc. dramatically
expanded the circumstances in which courts must defer to agency interpretations of statutes.” (internal footnote
omitted)).
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parsing out statutory language associated with a regulatory regime that is
“technical and complex.”289 There is no serious attempt to argue that these issues
of statutory interpretation fall outside the “question of law” category; instead,
the deviation from default treatment is driven by a recognition that, in this
sphere, the legitimacy gains to be achieved by fully realizing optimal allocation
of decision-making authority outweigh those gained from adherence to the
traditional model.290 Again, then, the traditional law-fact regime cracks, giving
way to change that pushes the legal system toward procedural justice.
Ultimately, the procedural justice model promises beneficial change.
Beyond theory and case law, embracing considerations of fairness when
classifying issues ultimately bolsters the legitimacy of adjudication itself.
Trading a vestigial insistence on the existence of an illusory theoretical
distinction for real-world improvements to courtroom decision making is a
worthwhile exchange.
CONCLUSION
The distinction between law and fact has bedeviled judges, practitioners, and
scholars alike. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously recognized: “From
saying that we will leave a question to the jury to saying that it is a question of
fact is but a step, and the result is that at this day it has come to be a widespread
doctrine that negligence not only is a question for the jury but is a question of
fact.”291 Justice Holmes’s observation highlights the oddity that is the law-fact
distinction. Turning away from that oddity, this Article imagines a classification
system driven entirely by principles of procedural justice. Where the
categorization of issues is primarily contingent on the most desirable allocation
of decision-making authority, adjudicative legitimacy can reach its optimum.
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